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Background: A number of cognitive biases (memory, attention and judgment) have been 
implicated in the development and maintenance of PTSD. However, people with PTSD 
stemming from different sources of trauma may present with different symptom profiles. In 
particular, military personnel are trained to attend to threat, to assess potential risks in the 
environment and to make rapid decisions about how to act. Cognitive biases may thus be 
adaptive in the context of deployment. This review aimed to elucidate the extent to which 
military personnel with and without PTSD demonstrate cognitive biases. 
 
Methods: Searches of the databases Embase, PsycINFO, PsycARTICLES, Medline and 
Web of Science were conducted. Studies were included if they made specific reference to 
cognitive biases, were conducted in a military population and involved direct measurement 
of PTSD symptoms. Only studies published in peer-reviewed journals, in English, and since 
1980 (when PTSD became a formal diagnosis) were included. Studies were excluded if they 
focused primarily on genetic, neurobiological or physiological factors, or if participants were 
under the age of 18 or presented with traumatic brain injury or intellectual disability. Study 
quality was assessed using a selection of questions from the Quality Assessment Tool for 
Quantitative Studies and the Research Degrees of Freedom Checklist.  
 
Results: 21 studies were included for review. The main finding in relation to memory biases 
was that military personnel with PTSD tend to be overgeneral when describing 
autobiographical memories. Most studies focused on attentional bias, and generally tended 
to be of higher quality. Earlier studies involved a modified Stroop task and found that 
trauma-related words tended to impair performance to a greater extent for those with vs. 
without PTSD. Later studies used dot-probe paradigms and conceptualised attentional 
response as a dynamic process, fluctuating between bias towards and away from threat; 
military personnel with vs. without PTSD demonstrated greater fluctuation. Other studies 
using visual search tasks and eye-tracking concluded that attentional bias in PTSD is 
characterised by interference (difficulty disengaging from threat) rather than facilitation 
(enhanced threat detection). Finally, there was only one study investigating interpretation 
bias, a form of judgment bias; this found that military personnel with PTSD tended to 
complete ambiguous sentences with negative rather than neutral endings to a greater extent 





Discussion: This review offers a novel contribution to the literature by examining cognitive 
biases specifically in the context of military PTSD. The relevance for military populations, 
methodological limitations of the studies and the review, recommendations for future 







1.1 WHAT ARE COGNITIVE BIASES? 
Everyday functioning requires people to make sense of the world around them. However, 
human beings are subjected to a potentially bewildering amount of sensory information at 
any given time. Processing all this information properly helps to guide behaviour but giving 
all information equal priority is inefficient and potentially risky. Instead, people are thought 
to make judgements about situations and decide what to do based on ‘heuristics’: rules of 
thumb or mental shortcuts that can reduce cognitive load and facilitate decision-making (e.g. 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Whilst this strategy is often highly adaptive, the way in which 
information is processed depends on individual predisposition and experience. Greifeneder 
et al. (2017) argue that people construct a personal, “subjective social reality”, and that it is 
this social reality rather than objective input that dictates their interpretation of events and 
behavioural responses. Thus, heuristics can lead to systematic errors or selectivity in the way 
people process information, referred to as cognitive biases. For example, confirmation bias 
describes a systematic tendency to search for, attend to and remember information that 
supports one’s preconceptions and to neglect information that contradicts them.  
 
Cognitive biases are extremely common in the general population. However, for some 
people, these biases are thought to be involved in the development and maintenance of 
anxiety disorders (e.g. Beard, 2011), including general anxiety disorder (GAD; Hayes and 
Hirsch, 2007), social phobia (Clark & McManus, 2002), obsessive compulsive disorder 
(OCD; Williams and Grisham, 2013), panic disorder (Teachman et al., 2007) and post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD; Buckley, 2000; Constans, 2005). The current review will 
focus on cognitive biases in PTSD.  
 
1.2 COGNITIVE BIASES IN PTSD 
PTSD is characterised by the re-experiencing of traumatic memories (e.g. via nightmares, 
intrusive thoughts or flashbacks), hypervigilance towards threat, and cognitive and 
behavioural avoidance in the aftermath of traumatic events. How might cognitive biases be 
involved in the development and maintenance of these symptom clusters? As described 
above, people’s experiences inform their subjective social reality, leading to selectivity in 
information processing. Traumatic experiences may lead to an overestimation of threat and 




inevitable (i.e. hypervigilance). Selective processing may also increase opportunities to be 
reminded of the original trauma, which may lead to re-experiencing symptoms. Biases in how 
information is appraised may also lead individuals to “keep themselves safe” by staying away 
from people or places that are perceived as threatening (behavioural avoidance) or by actively 
trying to suppress traumatic memories or reminders (cognitive avoidance). The research 
literature emphasises the association between three types of cognitive bias and PTSD (e.g. 
Constans, 2005); these will now be discussed in turn.  
 
1.2.1 Memory bias 
Memory bias refers to systematic impairments or fallacies in the encoding or retrieval of 
memories, such that recollection of previous experiences is distorted by current knowledge, 
belief or emotion (Schacter, 1999). For instance, people may exaggerate the consistency 
between their current and previous beliefs about social issues (e.g. political attitudes), when 
in reality these may have changed over time (Markus 1986). In the context of PTSD, a core 
diagnostic feature of re-experiencing symptoms suggests that traumatic memories are highly 
accessible (McNally et al., 1994). It is therefore plausible that people with the disorder are 
more likely to remember negative or threat-related versus neutral information (e.g. Moradi 
et al., 2000), since negative information may be perceived as more relevant or familiar. 
However, there is also evidence to indicate subtle impairments in memory recall (Buckley et 
al., 2000).  
 
Research has drawn a distinction between biases in explicit versus implicit memory. Explicit 
memory refers to the deliberate recollection of factual information (such as autobiographical 
experiences, facts and concepts; e.g. Ullman, 2004). By contrast, implicit memory typically 
refers to performance being facilitated by previous experiences without deliberate recollection 
(such as procedural tasks like riding a bike or unconscious priming, e.g. Schacter, 1987). 
There is an extensive literature on explicit and implicit memory, which is beyond the scope 
of the current review. However, biases in both explicit and implicit memory have been 
investigated in the context of anxiety and depressive disorders. For example, one study of 
explicit memory bias found that people with depression tended to recall more negative than 
positive words from a previously presented list (Bradley et al., 1995). The literature regarding 
explicit memory bias in PTSD is somewhat mixed; many studies have found that participants 
with vs. without PTSD recall more trauma-related words, but there is a high rate of false 
positives (whereby people report trauma-related words that were never presented; e.g. 




and also pairs of words where one was neutral and the other was trauma-related. Although 
Holocaust survivors with PTSD demonstrated relative deficits in overall recall, they 
remembered more trauma vs. neutral words, an enhancement effect which was not found 
for Holocaust survivors without PTSD or matched controls (Golier et al., 2003). This 
suggests that PTSD may facilitate associative learning of trauma-related information.  
 
In contrast with explicit memory tasks, tests of implicit memory bias can include procedural 
learning (e.g. mirror-drawing) and priming tasks (of which there are multiple types; see 
Schacter, 1992 for a review). An example of a priming task might involve target words being 
presented and a seemingly unrelated task (e.g. word-completion) being performed after a 
delay. Implicit memory bias is indicated if participants automatically generate target words in 
the latter task without being instructed to do so. Although implicit memory bias has been 
implicated in some anxiety disorders (Coles & Heimberg, 2002), previous reviews have found 
limited evidence in PTSD (Constans, 2005).  For instance, the study of Holocaust survivors 
described above (Golier et al., 2003) involved a second, implicit memory task (involving 
word-stem completion); this revealed no differences in implicit memory bias for survivors 
with and without PTSD.   
 
The studies described above may help to clarify how memory biases influence people with 
PTSD when they are learning and remembering new information. However, the paradigms 
used in these studies have been criticised for their limited ecological validity. Moreover, the 
inclusion of trauma-related words may not necessarily assess memory bias for highly personal 
traumatic events (Constans, 2005). In contrast with studies of explicit or implicit memory 
bias, other studies have described autobiographical memory biases, such as overgeneral 
memory bias (e.g. Williams & Broadbent, 1986). This refers to the tendency to describe broad 
categories of events rather than one specific occurrence. A small number of studies suggest 
that an overgeneral autobiographical memory bias exists in PTSD (e.g. Wessel et al., 2002), 
with one study also indicating that overgeneral memory in acute stress disorder is predictive 
of developing PTSD in the future (Harvey et al., 1998). It has been suggested that for people 
with PTSD, this bias arises from a deliberate strategy of avoiding specific trauma memories 
in order to manage emotional distress, and that this in turn leads to memory retrieval 
processes that lack specificity (Williams, 1996; Brewin et al., 1999).  
 
Taken together, there is some evidence to suggest that people with PTSD display explicit 




more innocuous information, and autobiographical memory bias, whereby they recall 
overgeneral categories more readily than specific events.  
 
1.2.2 Attentional bias  
Attentional bias refers to the tendency to allocate attention towards stimuli that are perceived 
as threatening. The capacity to redirect attention towards danger or strong threat is evidently 
an adaptive strategy (Mogg & Bradley, 1998). However, people with high levels of anxiety 
are sensitive to even mildly threatening stimuli. Continuous attentional bias towards mild 
threat may lead to increased stress and chronic hyperarousal, thus contributing directly to the 
development and maintenance of PTSD (Mathews & MacLeod, 2002). Two paradigms have 
been widely used to investigate attentional bias: emotional Stroop and dot probe.  
 
In the classic Stroop task (Stroop, 1935) participants are presented with colour words (i.e. 
red, green, blue) that are printed in either a matching ink colour (congruent condition; the 
word red in red ink) or mismatching ink colour (incongruent condition; the word red in green 
ink); they are then asked to name the ink colour (rather than read the colour word). People 
are typically slower on incongruent trials, highlighting an interference effect. In contrast, 
people are faster on congruent trials than when presented with neutral stimuli (e.g. red, green 
and blue squares), highlighting a facilitation effect. Both these effects are thought to be 
underpinned by the automaticity of reading. A substantial body of literature has adopted a 
modified version of the Stroop task (Modified Stroop Task; MST) to investigate attentional 
bias in anxiety disorders (e.g. Ben-Haim, et al., 2016). In this version of the task, participants 
are again asked to name the colour of the ink that words are printed in, but the words 
presented are either neutral or emotionally salient. Selective interference effects are thought 
to reflect the fact that emotionally salient words are more likely to capture attention and thus 
slow reaction time than neutral words. Numerous studies have demonstrated that regardless 
of the source of trauma, PTSD is associated with increased attentional capture for trauma-
related words in the MST (Constans, 2005).  
 
In the dot probe task, participants view a fixation cross at the centre of a computer screen, 
after which two stimuli (one neutral, one threatening) are presented simultaneously on either 
side of the screen for a brief, predetermined length of time (e.g. 500 milliseconds, although 
numerous studies have experimentally manipulated the duration of exposure). A target ‘dot’ 
is then presented in the same position as one of the previous stimuli, and participants are 




indicated by faster reaction times when the dot appears in the ‘threat’ position than the 
‘neutral’ position. A number of studies have measured attentional biases in anxiety disorders 
using the dot probe paradigm (Bar-Haim et al., 2007), but the evidence in relation to PTSD 
specifically has been mixed, with some studies linking PTSD with a bias towards threat and 
others with bias away from threat (Ashley et al., 2013; Schafer et al., 2016). The inconsistency 
of findings suggests that there may be fluctuations in attentional bias; this reflects PTSD 
symptomatology, since people with PTSD are both vigilant to and avoidant of threat. A 
metric that captures some of this variability in attention may provide a promising means of 
investigating differences between those with and without PTSD. Indeed, attentional bias has 
been more recently conceptualised as a dynamic process “expressed in fluctuating, phasic 
bursts, toward and/or away from target stimuli over time” (Zvielli et al., 2015).   
 
Despite the mixed findings yielded using the dot probe paradigm, a number of studies have 
employed the task as a means of ameliorating attentional bias, with some success. These 
studies involve repeated sessions in which the dot is systematically positioned in the location 
of the non-threatening stimulus in order to train attention away from threat (Bar-Haim, 
2010), or where the dot is presented with equal frequency in both locations in order to 
enhance attentional control (Wald et al., 2016). There is also some evidence that this training 
can ameliorate symptoms of PTSD (Wald et al., 2016).  
 
In summary, there is substantial evidence to suggest that in comparison with healthy controls, 
people with PTSD demonstrate attentional bias; they are more sensitive to and easily 
distracted by mildly threatening stimuli.   
 
1.2.3 Judgment Biases 
Biases in judgment are thought to contribute to elevated anxiety and to the maintenance of 
PTSD symptoms (Ehlers & Clark, 2000). This is because a systematic tendency to judge the 
world as threatening may perpetuate feelings of fear and vulnerability and reinforce 
avoidance behaviours. Two specific biases in judgement are thought to be theoretically 
relevant to PTSD: subjective risk bias and interpretation bias (Constans, 2005). Subjective 
risk bias describes an increased perception of threats in the environment and the tendency 
to overestimate the likelihood of negative events taking place in future. For instance, 
symptoms of acute stress and PTSD are associated with a propensity to judge future negative 





As opposed to future-focused, subjective estimates of risk, interpretation bias describes the 
way in which people make judgements about current, ambiguous information. In the context 
of PTSD and other anxiety disorders, researchers have focused on paradigms that present 
words or sentences that may have threatening or non-threatening meanings. For example, in 
one task, anxious participants read homophones (such as die/dye) out loud and were asked 
to spell them, to see whether they would choose the threatening or non-threatening spelling 
(Eysenck et al., 1987). One study found that participants with PTSD were more likely to end 
ambiguous sentences with trauma-related words than those without (Kimble, 2002), implying 
a bias towards threatening interpretations of ambiguous information.  
 
Despite a clear theoretical rationale, very few studies appear to have investigated subjective 
risk bias or interpretation bias in PTSD; doing so may help to illuminate any systematic errors 
in the ways in which people with PTSD make judgments about current and future threat.  
 
1.3 TRAUMATIC EXPERIENCES 
1.3.1 Relevance of type of trauma  
There is currently a lack of clarity in the literature regarding how cognitive biases might 
operate in those with PTSD originating from different sources of trauma. Individuals may 
meet the criteria for a diagnosis of PTSD after experiencing a diverse range of traumatic 
incidents. These traumatic incidents may have different properties with different outcomes, 
and lead people to hold different sorts of beliefs. For instance, there is some evidence that 
people who have experienced natural disasters may be most likely to view the world as an 
unjust and unpredictable place (e.g.  Garcia et al., 2015) and must cope with numerous 
secondary stressors such as severe and enduring social and economic consequences (e.g. the 
loss of one’s home).  By contrast, survivors of an assault may have prominent beliefs about 
other people as dangerous and untrustworthy or about themselves as weak or defective in 
some way (e.g. Ali et al., 2002). PTSD symptoms experienced by assault-survivors can also 
vary depending on the type and severity of assault (Hembree et al., 2004), as well as peri-
traumatic factors such as whether the victim experienced ‘mental defeat’, whereby one’s 
sense of self is threatened (Ehlers et al., 2000).   
 
1.3.2 Cognitive bias and military PTSD 
Differences in the severity, symptom profile and chronicity of PTSD may also be observed 
depending on whether the indexed trauma was a brief, one-off event (such as assaults or 




more common within military populations. Unsurprisingly, members of the armed forces 
(and other professions such as the police or emergency services that involve high levels of 
exposure to distressing situations) are at particular risk for developing PTSD (Stevelink et al., 
2018). In addition to increased prevalence, symptom severity in veteran versus civilian 
populations appears to be greater, even when exposed to traumatic events of a similar 
magnitude (Brinker et al., 2007). For instance, research studies have found that people 
hospitalised due to combat are more likely to report re-experiencing and hyperarousal than 
those hospitalised for other traumatic events (Gaylord et al., 2004) and combat veterans 
present with more symptoms of hyperarousal than victims of sexual abuse (Henigsberg et 
al., 2001).  
 
Beyond prevalence and symptom severity, there are specific characteristics associated with 
PTSD that may be particularly relevant for military personnel. They may experience a 
diminished sense of identity (Brewin, et al., 2010), associated with a change in role when 
returning from active service, and they may feel alienated from society or as though their 
service was underappreciated (Shay, 2002; Childers, 2009). One possible explanation of this 
is that unlike many other sources of trauma, traumatic experiences arising from deployment 
are likely to take place outside of one’s usual environment. This presents an additional 
dimension when considering the development and maintenance of military PTSD: 
adjustment difficulties when reintegrating into civilian life. This is thought to pose a 
significant challenge; for example, although warzone-related difficulties such as social 
isolation or poor unit cohesion are linked to negative health outcomes, veterans with PTSD 
are also adversely affected by difficulties at home (Browne et al., 2007). Adjustment 
difficulties may include strained familial relationships (Gold et al., 2007) and other aspects of 
functional impairment such as difficulty obtaining or sustaining employment after leaving 
service, social functioning, and substance misuse (Maguen et al., 2009). 
 
How might adjustment difficulties relate to the role of cognitive biases in military PTSD? As 
described above, many cognitive biases are adaptive ways to make rapid, efficient decisions. 
Military deployments are often inherently threatening, and thus the ability to recall threat-
related information readily, to attend rapidly to threat and to assess risks when deciding on 
behaviour are effective strategies in that particular context (Castro et al., 2015). Nonetheless, 
this threat vigilance, whilst adaptive in military environments, has been found to predict post-




personnel with similar experiences of combat exposure who go on to develop PTSD make 
similar cognitive appraisals to those who do not.  
 
In summary, whilst cognitive biases are a core feature of PTSD regardless of the source of 
trauma, there is a strong theoretical case to be made for focusing on how these processes 
operate in the context of specifically military PTSD.  
 
1.4 CURRENT REVIEW 
In summary, cognitive biases such as excessive attention to threat after an isolated traumatic 
event might represent a departure from the norm for many people with PTSD. This may not 
be the case for military personnel with PTSD, who are potentially accustomed to remaining 
vigilant to threat when deployed. For this population, adjustment to civilian life, with 
objectively fewer day-to-day threats, might present a significant challenge. Despite the ample 
evidence for cognitive misappraisals in PTSD, no systematic review to date has explored 
these processes specifically within military populations. This is an important line of inquiry, 
since service personnel often have to operate under prolonged stress during which sensitivity 
to perceived dangers and a tendency to interpret ambiguous information as threatening may 
in fact be highly adaptive, irrespective of subsequent PTSD symptomatology (Castro et al., 
2015). The extent to which military personnel with versus without PTSD differ in their 
cognitive appraisals is thus unclear. The current review aimed to address this question by 
systematically examining the evidence base for the role of specific cognitive biases implicated 
in military PTSD.  
 
Whilst cognitive biases are considered central to cognitive accounts of PTSD, Nanney et al. 
(2015) argued that much of the literature uses inconsistent definitions of the term. They drew 
a distinction between processes and products. Processes refer to active, online appraisals of 
incoming information whereas products primarily refer to beliefs (e.g. specific cognitions 
about the self, world or other people). Nanney et al. (2015) concluded that products arise 
from processes. For instance, attending disproportionately to threat (process) leads to the 
belief that the world is unsafe (product). In line with this argument, and consistent with early 
research from the experimental cognitive psychology literature, the current review only 
included research that examines processes rather than products. Specifically, the constructs 
of memory bias, attentional bias, subjective risk bias and interpretation bias will be examined, 







2.1 SEARCH STRATEGY 
The databases Embase, PsycINFO, PsycARTICLES, Medline and Web of Science were 
searched for the current review. The search was carried out between 12th-15th October 2018 
using the following search strategy:  
• The search terms cognitive appraisal*, appraisal*, cognitive misappraisal*, 
misappraisal*, misinterpretation*, cognitive bias*, negative cognition*, interpret* 
bias and attent* bias were combined using the OR Boolean operator 
• The search terms PTSD, posttraumatic stress disorder and post-traumatic stress 
disorder were combined using the OR Boolean operator 
• The search terms military and veterans were combined using the OR Boolean 
operator 
• The results from each of the above three searches were combined using the AND 
Boolean operator 
In addition to this search strategy, Google scholar citations and reference lists of review 
papers were searched for relevant studies. Each stage of the search process is outlined using 
the PRISMA flowchart (see Figure 3.1). 
 
2.2 INCLUSION/EXCLUSION CRITERIA  
All studies meeting the following criteria were included: 
• Those that made reference to specific cognitive biases, appraisals or thinking styles 
(e.g. attentional bias, interpretation bias, subjective risk bias or memory bias). This 
was to ensure that the scope of the review was manageable and to focus on the 
cognitive processes involved in making appraisals rather than the content or product of 
appraisals (e.g. specific negative thoughts or beliefs), since this is thought to carry the 
greatest relevance for the development and maintenance of PTSD.  
• In line with the aims of this review, only studies involving military or veteran 
populations.  
• In line with the aims of this review, only studies where PTSD symptomatology was 
directly measured  
• Only studies appearing in peer reviewed journals  




All studies meeting the following criteria were excluded: 
• Studies conducted prior to 1980, when PTSD became a formal diagnosis 
• Studies focusing primarily on genetic, neurobiological or physiological factors 
• Studies where participants presented with traumatic brain injury or intellectual 
disability 
• Studies involving participants under the age of 18 
 
2.3 QUALITY ASSESSMENT  
2.3.1 Quality assessment tools  
The quality of the studies in the current systematic review was measured using selected 
questions from two separate tools: the Quality Assessment Tool for Quantitative studies 
(QATQ) and the Researcher Degrees of Freedom Checklist (RDFC).  
 
2.3.1.1 Quality Assessment Tool for Quantitative Studies (QATQ) 
The QATQ is a standardised tool that was developed as part of the Effective Public Health 
Practice Project (EPHPP; 1998) and is suitable for any articles related to a public health topic. 
It comprises eight domains, each of which receives a rating of ‘strong’, ‘moderate’ or ‘weak’ 
based on specific criteria outlined in a supplementary dictionary. The first six criteria 
(selection bias, study design, confounders, blinding, data collection method and withdrawals 
and dropouts) combine to give a global rating. This tool has been found to have acceptable 
content validity and test-retest reliability (Thomas et al., 2004).  This tool was selected 
primarily for its methodological rigour and relevance for health-related research. However, 
the QATQ and other quality assessment tools (such as checklists developed by the Critical 
Appraisal Skills Programme; CASP) are primarily used to assess the quality of randomised 
control trials (RCTs), which are considered the gold standard in public health research 
focused on establishing the efficacy of an intervention. In contrast, the aims of the current 
review were to evaluate experimental research that has focused on specific cognitive 
mechanisms as opposed to a health intervention. Thus, many commonly-used quality 
assessment tools were not deemed suitable for the current review, and only 3 of the 6 QATQ 
domains that comprise a global methodology rating were used to assess the quality of studies 
in this review: 
• Selection bias: the extent to which study participants are likely to be representative 




selected from a comprehensive list of individuals in the target population (e.g. all 
soldiers from a specific battalion, brigade or geographical region). Participants are 
somewhat likely to be representative if referred from a source (e.g. a clinic) and are 
unlikely to be representative if self-referred. 
• Confounders: the extent to which confounding variables have been controlled for, 
either in design (by stratification or matching) or in the analysis.  
• Data collection methods: the extent to which outcome measures are described as 
reliable and valid.   
The remaining three domains (study design, blinding and withdrawals and dropouts) are 
most applicable in relation to research articles describing an intervention and will therefore 
not be included in the formal quality assessment.  
 
2.3.1.2 Researcher Degrees of Freedom Checklist  
Few tools have been developed and evaluated to assess the quality of experimental studies. 
The RDFC was developed to address a key criticism of experimental research in psychology: 
decisions made in the planning, design, analysis and reporting of studies are often somewhat 
arbitrary and can thus lead to an increased chance of false positives (Type 1 errors) and to 
inflated effect sizes, which often lead to findings that cannot be replicated. The checklist is 
primarily for researchers to make more sound methodological decisions when conducting a 
study or for reviewers to assess the quality of preregistered studies; after a study has been 
published, it is difficult to establish whether all the criteria have been met. For example, one 
cannot tell from reading a paper whether the researchers continued recruiting until a 
significant p-value was obtained, measured multiple additional variables and dropped non-
significant ones, determined hypotheses after results were known or engaged in any other 
questionable research practices. Nonetheless, a subset of the checklist criteria can be used to 
assess research quality following publication:  
• Conducting explorative research without any hypothesis OR studying a vague 
hypothesis that fails to specify the direction of the effect  
• Creating multiple manipulated independent variables and conditions OR measuring 
the same dependent variable in several alternative ways 






2.3.2 Quality scoring  
Studies were rated on six aspects of quality, based on the combined QATQ and RDFC 
criteria, on a 0-2 point scale, giving a maximum score of 12 (see Appendix). 20% of articles 








3.1 SEARCH RESULTS 
See Figure 1 for a comprehensive overview of the search results. The initial search yielded 
90 results from Embase, 145 from PsycINFO, 463 from PsycARTICLES, 82 from Medline 
and 273 from Web of Science. Searches of additional sources (reference lists; Google Scholar 
citations) returned nine further results, giving a total of 1062 articles. 801 articles remained 
after duplicates were removed. The titles and abstracts of these articles were then screened 
for relevance and 772 articles were excluded at this stage. The main reasons for exclusion 
included no reference to a cognitive bias, no specific focus on PTSD, study participants had 
no military background, study participants had comorbid traumatic brain injury, or studies 
described primarily genetic or neurobiological factors.  
 
The full text of the remaining 31 articles was then examined. One of the aims of the current 
review was to elucidate any differences in cognitive biases between military personnel with 
and without PTSD. On these grounds, a further six studies were excluded since they only 
included participants presenting with symptoms of PTSD, without a control group for 
comparison. One study was also excluded since participants were drawn from a traumatic 
brain injury clinic. Another study was excluded since the control group was not from a 
military background. One further study was excluded since it included a measure of PTSD 
symptomatology, but no participants met the clinical threshold. Lastly, one study was 
excluded since it described a behavioural rather than cognitive bias (focusing on physically 
approaching versus avoiding threat). Thus, a final set of 21 studies were included for review.  
 
3.2 PARTICIPANT CHARACTERISTICS  
An overview of the participant characteristics in all included studies is described in detail in 
Table 3.1. Across the 21 studies, the total number of participants was 1977. In line with the 
research on military PTSD, participants in the studies were overwhelmingly male. With 
respect to conflict, participants in 11 studies were veterans from the Vietnam war, 
participants in seven studies were current or ex-soldiers involved in Operation Enduring 
Freedom (OEF; the US war in Afghanistan) and/or Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF; the US-
Iraq war). The conflict was not specified for the remaining three studies (with participants 
recruited from state veterans’ organisations/clinics etc.). It is worth noting that 18 of the 21 




studies recruited participants from the Israeli armed forces and the final study recruited 
German soldiers; the current review did not find any studies examining cognitive biases in 
UK military populations with and without PTSD.   
 
With respect to the approach taken in the reviewed studies, 16 were experimental studies 
directly contrasting those with and without PTSD on a measure of cognitive bias. Three of 
these studies also involved a civilian control group. The five remaining studies examined 
cohorts of soldiers pre- and/or post-deployment and correlated measures of cognitive bias 
with PTSD symptomatology. Some of these studies aimed to elucidate factors that are 
predictive of PTSD post-deployment; others investigated whether bias modification or 
training programmes could be used as a preventative measure, to reduce the likelihood of 
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Table 3.1: Study characteristics  
 
 




1. McNally et al., 1990  Vietnam veterans with/without PTSD  USA  30  PTSD: 40.07;   100% male  
Non-PTSD: 43.40   
 
 
2. Zeitlin & McNally, 1990 Vietnam veterans with/without PTSD  USA  48  PTSD: 41.13;   100% male  
Non-PTSD: 43.88   
 
 
3. McNally et al., 1994  Vietnam veterans with PTSD, alternative USA  82  Not reported  100% male 
diagnoses and veteran controls 
 
 
4. McNally et al., 1995   Vietnam veterans with/without PTSD  USA  32  PTSD: 46;  100% male 
Non-PTSD: 49  
 
 
5. Kaspi et al., 1995  Vietnam veterans with/without PTSD  USA  60  PTSD: 41.6;   100% male 
              Non-PTSD: 44.3 
 
 
6. Vrana et al., 1995  Vietnam veterans with/without PTSD  USA  57  PTSD: 44.8;  100% male
              Non-PTSD: 47.9 
 
 











8. Amir et al., 1996  Vietnam veterans with/without PTSD  USA  28  PTSD: 47.3;  100% male 
 
              Non-PTSD: 47.5  
 




10. Pineles et al., 2007  Vietnam veterans with/without PTSD  USA  57  PTSD: 54.69;  100% male 
              Non-PTSD: 54.30 
 
11. Armstrong et al., 2013 Afghanistan/Iraq veterans with/without USA  58  PTSD: 32.62;   >90% male
    PTSD & civilian controls        Non-PTSD: 34.69;  
Civilian: 32.81 
 
12. Ashley et al., 2013  Afghanistan/Iraq veterans with/without USA  90  PTSD: 32.3;   >90% male 
    PTSD & civilian controls        Non-PTSD: 33.6;  
Civilian: 32.2 
 
13. Olatunji et al., 2013 Veterans with/without PTSD    USA  58  PTSD: 33.55;   >90% male 
& civilian controls        Non-PTSD: 34.69;  
Civilian: 32.86 
 











15. Constans et al., 2014 Afghanistan/Iraq veterans with/without USA  124  33.84   89.5% male 
    PTSD & with/without overreporting style    
 
 




17. Khanna et al., 2016  Afghanistan/Iraq veterans with/without USA  41  Not reported  100% male 
    PTSD 
 
 
18. Schafer et al., 2016  Soldiers pre and post-deployment to  Germany 158  Baseline 26.3;  100% male  
    Afghanistan          Follow-up 27.8 
 
 




20. Swick & Ashley, 2017  Afghanistan/Iraq veterans with/without USA  56  PTSD: 35.14;   >90% male  
     PTSD          Non-PTSD: 38.32  
 
 






Table 3.2: Key findings and quality assessment      
 
 





1. McNally et al., 1990  Attention Modified Stroop  Interference effects on emotional Stroop for    9 
PTSD group only, specifically to trauma words  
(and not positive emotional words) 
 
2.  Zeitlin & McNally, 1990 Memory Implicit & explicit  Evidence of both implicit and explicit memory  7 
      cued recall    bias towards threat vs. non-threat words in PTSD 
 
3. McNally et al., 1994  Memory Autobiographical   Overgeneral memory characterised PTSD and    8 
memory retrieval  depression; exposure to traumatic reminders exacerbated 
overgenerality only for participants with PTSD and not  
those with depression 
 
4. McNally et al., 1995  Memory Autobiographical   Participants with vs. without PTSD described more   7 
memory retrieval   overgeneral memories, particularly with positive cues 
 
 
5. Kaspi et al., 1995  Attention Modified Stroop  Combat-related words produced greater interference   7 
than neutral/positive/other negative words, and this was  
exacerbated in those with PTSD. 
 
6. Vrana et al., 1995  Attention Modified Stroop  Participants with PTSD were slower on the task overall,  9 
and interference effects for anxiety-related words were  













7. McNally & Amir, 1996 Memory Implicit memory for  No evidence found for memory bias for trauma-  5 
      visually-presented words related words 
 
8. Amir et al., 1996  Memory Implicit memory for  Implicit memory bias for combat-related sentences  9 
      auditorily-presented  for PTSD participants but not controls 
      sentences  
 
9. Kimble et al., 2002         Interpretation Sentence completion  Veterans with PTSD produced significantly more   9 
military endings than non-military endings to  
sentences, indicating interpretation bias 
 
10. Pineles et al., 2007  Attention Visual search   Interference effects of threat words,     10 
but not facilitated detection of threat words,  
found for high vs. low PTSD participants   
  
 
11. Armstrong et al., 2013 Attention Eye-tracking   PTSD characterised by sustained attention   10 
towards threat but not facilitated detection 
 
12. Ashley et al., 2013  Attention Modified Stroop  PTSD participants had slower reaction times    10 
Overall; this was exacerbated for combat-related  
words. PTSD participants habituated but at a  













13. Olatunji et al., 2013 Attention Rapid serial    PTSD participants’ performance was impaired,   10 
      visual presentation   but only for combat-related threat distractors  
(rather than generally negative stimuli), indicating  
increased attentional capture and difficulty disengaging  
 
14. Wisco et al., 2013  Attention Visual search   Thought suppression and worry mediate the relationship  10 
between attentional interference and re-experiencing/ 
avoidance symptoms of PTSD 
 
15. Constans et al., 2014 Attention Modified Stroop  Overreporting bias augments the modified Stroop effect  6 
in veterans with PTSD. This suggests that overreporting  
reflects overall distress rather than malingering 
 
16. Sipos et al., 2014  Attention Dot probe   With low combat exposure, attentional performance   8 
and PTSD symptoms appeared unrelated. However, with  
high combat exposure, participants with slower response to  
threat stimuli reported higher PTSD symptoms. 
 
17. Khanna et al., 2016  Attention Modified Stroop and  Only participants with PTSD exhibited combat-  10 
      Attention training   related Stroop interference. Attention training (especially) 
      using dot probe  attentional control training) improved task performance. 
 
18. Schafer et al., 2016  Attention Dot probe   Separating attentional bias into ‘towards’, ‘away’, and   10 
‘temporal variability’ predicted PTSD symptoms post- 











19. Wald et al., 2016  Attention Attention training   The most effective preventative intervention (producing  11
      using dot probe  significantly lower levels of post-deployment PTSD) was  
low-dose attentional bias modification training 
 
20. Swick & Ashley, 2017  Attention Dot probe   PTSD participants were slower overall. No group   9 
differences in bias towards or away from threat emerged.  
The PTSD group showed greater fluctuations in  
attentional bias than controls. 
 
21. Wald et al., 2017  Attention Attention training  Training on attentional bias, but not attentional control,  10
  
      Using dot probe  moderated the association between combat exposure and  
          PTSD symptoms 





3.3 OVERVIEW OF STUDIES 
Table 3.2 describes the cognitive bias examined in each article, the paradigm or task used to 
measure this bias, the key findings and a total quality score.  
 
3.3.1 Research relating to memory bias in military PTSD 
The current review revealed five studies that have examined memory biases in combat 
veterans with and without PTSD. In the first, Zeitlin and McNally (1991) aimed to examine 
both explicit and implicit memory bias. Participants were presented with neutral and trauma-
relevant words, and then then completed an implicit recall task for half the words, in which 
they were instructed to complete word stems with any word they liked, and an explicit recall 
task, whereby they were instructed to complete word stems with the word from the original 
list. With respect to explicit recall, participants with PTSD demonstrated a relative (but not 
absolute) memory bias, recalling more combat-related than neutral words, but not in 
comparison with the control group. With respect to implicit recall, the effects of priming 
were greater for combat-related words than other words, but only in the PTSD group. The 
authors concluded that there was evidence for both implicit and explicit memory bias in 
participants with PTSD. However, it should be noted that the implicit and explicit memory 
tasks were very similar, since both involved completing word stems.  
 
Two subsequent studies claimed to focus exclusively on implicit memory bias. In the first 
study, McNally & Amir (1996) presented combat veterans with and without PTSD with 
trauma-related, positive and neutral words, half of which had been presented before. The 
words were presented very briefly and then masked. Both groups demonstrated perceptual 
priming by accurately identifying a greater number of old versus new words, but there was 
no enhancement effect for trauma words in the PTSD group. In the second study, Amir et 
al. (1996) presented combat veterans with and without PTSD with combat-related and 
neutral sentences, half of which had been presented before. The sentences were accompanied 
by background noise of varying volume. The findings revealed that participants with PTSD 
demonstrated an implicit memory bias for combat-related sentences to a greater extent than 
those without PTSD, but only under the high-volume condition. Thus, the first study did 
not find evidence for group differences in bias and the second study did. What could account 
for the inconsistency in findings? One key difference between the two studies was the task 
used to measure implicit memory bias. The first study (McNally & Amir, 1996) used words 
as stimuli, and the researchers considered the possibility that doing so may emphasise 




second study (Amir et al., 1996) arguably provided more context and therefore had greater 
semantic meaning. In this study, lower estimates of background noise volume for old vs. new 
sentences was interpreted as evidence for implicit memory bias, based on the argument that 
there is reduced interference for familiar or easily processed information. The finding that 
only participants with PTSD demonstrated an implicit memory bias for combat-related 
sentences led the authors to conclude that threat-related information may be automatically 
accessed in PTSD. However, it should be noted that group differences were only revealed 
when the background noise was high in volume, indicating a relatively subtle effect of implicit 
memory bias. Most importantly, the tasks described thus far, involving either 
implicit/explicit variants or repeated exposure to stimuli, comprise conditions that take place 
in relatively quick succession, without a delay. Thus, it is possible that participants’ 
performance in all of these studies was contaminated by recent viewing of specific target 
stimuli. Whilst a contamination effect does not necessarily account for group differences, the 
extent to which the authors can claim to genuinely measure distinct aspects of memory bias 
is unclear.  
 
The current review revealed two final studies examining autobiographical memory bias. 
McNally et al. (1994) argued that whilst the laboratory paradigms used to examine memory 
biases are methodologically rigorous, they lack ecological validity, and stimulus sets involving 
single trauma-related words are at best a proxy for the richer, vivid autobiographical 
memories characteristic of PTSD. In an attempt to address this, McNally et al. (1994) and 
McNally et al. (1995) asked participants to retrieve specific autobiographical memories in 
response to neutral, positive and negative cue words. These studies found that veterans with 
PTSD were more likely to describe overgeneral rather than specific memories than those 
without PTSD. This overgenerality was exacerbated following exposure to traumatic 
reminders, which supports the view that this memory bias serves the function of protecting 
individuals from the emotional distress associated with traumatic memories. One post-hoc 
observation in McNally et al. (1995) was that overgenerality effects were also exacerbated for 
veterans who happened to be wearing war-related regalia during the study. The authors 
tentatively suggested that wearing war regalia in daily life may represent a constant reminder 
of or psychological fixation to combat-related traumatic memories, which in turn enhances 
autobiographical memory bias.  
  
In summary, very few studies have been conducting that examine memory biases in military 




explicit memory biases in PTSD, and somewhat more consistent stronger evidence for an 
autobiographical memory bias. Specifically, military personnel with PTSD in the reviewed 
studies appear to be overgeneral when describing their memories. Overgenerality was 
revealed for both positive and negative memories. It is thus possible that autobiographical 
memory bias contributes to the maintenance of PTSD in two ways. Firstly, by avoiding 
specific aspects of trauma memories, the memory is not properly processed and remains 
easily accessible. Secondly, by avoiding specific aspects of positive memories, people have 
limited opportunity to improve their mood or to challenge negative beliefs with contradictory 
evidence. However, given the limited number of studies and the quality of evidence available, 
further research is needed to elucidate the potential role of memory bias in military PTSD.  
 
3.3.2 Research relating to attentional bias in military PTSD 
The vast majority of the studies in the current review related to attentional bias in PTSD. Of 
these studies, six used the modified Stroop task (MST), five used a dot probe paradigm, one 
used both MST and dot probe, three used visual search paradigms and the final involved eye-
tracking technology. The key conclusions pertaining to each type of paradigm will now be 
discussed in turn.  
 
3.3.2.1 Attentional bias and the modified Stroop task (MST) 
The earliest study examining attentional bias in military personnel with and without PTSD 
using the MST was conducted by McNally et al. (1990). The authors argued that poor 
processing of trauma memory and associated re-experiencing phenomena indicate that 
cognitive representations of trauma reside in a primed or partially activated state in memory. 
They use this as theoretical justification for using the MST (since trauma words relating to 
partially activated cognitive representations should produce greater attentional interference 
than neutral words). In this preliminary study, veterans with and without PTSD were 
presented with trauma-related, OCD-related, positive and neutral words in the MST format. 
As described above, this involves participants naming the ink-colour words are presented in, 
with the expectation that more emotionally salient words will produce greater interference 
effects (i.e. reaction time delays). In line with predictions, veterans with PTSD took longer 
to respond to trauma-related words than any other word type; control group did not exhibit 
this interference effect. This suggests that PTSD symptoms rather than combat exposure 
were responsible for attentional interference. The fact that the interference effect was only 
for trauma-words in the PTSD group led the authors to conclude that attentional interference 




or other emotionally salient (e.g. positive) stimuli. However, it is possible that the emotional 
valence of trauma-related words is stronger (more negative) than positive words, and that 
interference effects could reflect general emotionality rather than traumatic content. Even 
though OCD-related words were used as an alternative set of disorder-related, negative 
stimuli, these were words such as “germs” which were unlikely to have had the same 
emotional salience (for non-OCD sufferers) as words such as “bodybags”. Moreover, using 
independently-rated words as stimuli may be a flawed approach, since traumatic memories 
are highly subjective. Kaspi et al. (1995) aimed to address these concerns by creating 
personalised stimulus sets for use with the MST, based on participants’ subjective ratings of 
the emotionality of target words, and found that participants with PTSD had greater 
interference for combat-related words than for neutral, positive or negative non-trauma 
words.  
 
In contrast to earlier studies, Vrana et al. (1995) found that negative words that varied with 
respect to their direct relevance to combat all produced interference effects relative to neutral 
words. The study also revealed that veterans with PTSD were able to recall more emotional 
words (but not more neutral words) than veterans without PTSD. This suggested that MST 
interference effects were mediated by attentional bias towards emotionally salient words, 
rather than distraction caused by attentional avoidance of threat-related information. 
Nonetheless, given that PTSD is characterised by both vigilance towards threat and 
avoidance of threat, further research is needed to unpick the mechanisms underpinning 
attentional bias. Unlike the McNally et al. (1990) study, both the subsequent studies described 
above found that healthy combat veterans demonstrated the same relative interference for 
traumatic vs. neutral words, but to a lesser extent than those with PTSD. However, no 
civilian control group was included, and so the relative contributions of trauma exposure and 
PTSD symptomatology cannot be elucidated.  
 
More recent studies involving the MST have emphasised other aspects of attentional bias. 
Firstly, Ashley et al. (2013) recognised that previous studies examining the MST in military 
PTSD have involved combat veterans from the Vietnam war, and wished to confirm that 
findings extended to veterans in more modern-day conflicts; they also wished to investigate 
the extent to which habituation to emotional stimuli can be elicited using the MST. In order 
to address both these aims, their study involved veterans who had been involved in the wars 
in Afghanistan and/or Iraq and involved completing the MST across multiple blocks. They 




were slower and less accurate overall and had significantly more interference on combat-
related words (but not other emotional words) when compared with veterans without PTSD. 
The results suggested that the PTSD group successfully habituated to combat-related words, 
but at a delayed rate. This lends some support to the continued use of interventions such as 
exposure therapy, which rely on desensitisation or habituation effects, although habituation 
findings from studies using abstract tasks such as the MST may not be generaliseable to real-
world threat stimuli.   
 
In another recent study, Khanna et al. (2016) highlighted design flaws in many earlier studies 
using the MST. For instance, the negative affect conditions included longer, less common or 
more unusually spelled words, factors which could account for delayed reaction times. 
Khanna et al. (2016) used a highly-controlled word list to minimise the confounding effects 
of lexical features (such as word length and frequency of use), involving only monosyllabic 
words that were neutral, war-related or negative in nature (e.g. “tune”, “bomb” or “tax). The 
findings demonstrated that only veterans with PTSD exhibited interference effects for 
combat-related stimuli. Thus, after controlling for design variables, interference effects on 
the MST were negated for veterans without PTSD.  
 
Lastly, a study by Constans et al. (2014) aimed to investigate a controversial trend whereby 
combat veterans have been reported to seek psychological and financial support for PTSD 
symptoms at a rate that exceeds estimates for the prevalence of PTSD in the veteran 
population. This is a contentious issue, and both deliberate malingering and a ‘cry for help’ 
have been proposed as possible explanations. The authors recruited veterans without PTSD, 
veterans with PTSD with and without an “overreporting style”. This was described as a 
tendency to exaggerate or elevate symptoms and was determined using a self-report measure 
that has been validated against a structured interview schedule. The MST was administered 
because it is very difficult to feign impaired performance (even when offered financial 
incentives). Given the difficulty in falsifying interference effects, it was also thought that if 
the two PTSD groups differed in MST performance, the task could be used as a means of 
improving diagnostic accuracy. The most notable finding was that an overreporting style 
augmented the MST effect in veterans with PTSD, suggesting that overreporting reflected 
overall distress. The notion that overreporting in this sample was associated with distress 
rather than deliberate malingering for financial gain was supported by the finding that both 





In summary, a number of studies have used selective interference on the MST as a measure 
of attentional bias and found group differences between veterans with and without PTSD. 
This interference effect appears to be strongest when words are directly related to combat 
or traumatic experiences as opposed to being generally negative in valence. The effect persists 
when various characteristics of the stimulus set are controlled for, such as word length and 
frequency of use. Although at a delayed rate, veterans with PTSD habituate on the MST, 
which may further substantiate interventions such as exposure therapy (although the extent 
to which the findings of experimental studies generalise to real-world settings is unclear). 
Despite reasonably convincing research evidence indicating that the MST differentiates 
between military personnel with and without PTSD, the task has some limitations. Firstly, it 
is a gross measure that does not necessarily disentangle the mechanisms underpinning 
attentional bias. For example, the interference of emotionally salient words could reflect 
enhanced ability to detect threat, reduced cognitive resource, or difficulty shifting focus back 
to a task once threat has captured attention. The MST is also restricted by only including 
visually presented words. This precludes the examination of attentional bias in other sensory 
modalities (e.g. attending to threatening words or sounds, such as gunshots), or using richer 
stimulus sets (e.g. images, scenes, faces, videos etc.). Lastly, the MST has limited diagnostic 
utility and has not been used to manipulate or reduce attentional bias or to ameliorate PTSD 
symptoms. More recent research studies using the dot probe paradigm have addressed some 
of these limitations, and this literature will be discussed below. 
   
3.3.2.2 Attentional bias and the dot probe paradigm 
As described in the introduction, the dot probe paradigm involves a target appearing on a 
screen in the location where one of two stimuli (threatening or non-threatening) was 
previously presented. Whilst research investigating attentional bias using the MST has 
typically found interference effects for trauma-words, studies using the dot probe task have 
yielded mixed findings, with some indicating that PTSD in the general population is 
associated with attentional bias towards threat and others suggesting bias away from threat 
(e.g. Constans, 2005). In the current review, the search strategy returned three studies using 
the task within military populations, and a further three studies that used the task as part of 
a training programme. None of these studies found a clear-cut relationship between PTSD 
symptomatology and performance on the dot probe task. For instance, Sipos et al. (2014) 
examined dot probe performance using happy, neutral and angry faces as stimuli and found 
that the association between attentional bias and PTSD symptoms depended on the level of 




threat locations (indicating bias away from threat) but only in the high combat exposure 
group.  
 
In another study included in the current review, Schafer et al. (2016) posited that a static 
measure of attentional bias is overly simplistic and does not account for the dynamic, multi-
stage nature of threat-processing. The authors suggested that it is not simply attentional bias 
towards or away from threat, but rather an overall dysregulation in the attentional system 
that makes it no longer adaptive in people with PTSD. They outline the case for multiple 
attentional stages in PTSD (hypervigilance, maintained attention, disengagement, strategic 
avoidance, further hypervigilance etc.). These stages would indicate attentional peaks 
(towards threat) and troughs (away from threat) that are more extreme in people with PTSD. 
Thus, averaging across multiple trials without accounting for within-participant temporal 
variability was proposed as a possible explanation for mixed findings in the literature. In 
order to investigate this, Schafer et al. (2016) administered a version of the dot probe task 
(also using emotional faces as stimuli) to German soldiers pre- and post- deployment to 
Afghanistan. They calculated both traditional mean latency scores and trial by trial analyses 
in order to compute both static and dynamic measures of attentional bias. They found that 
separating attentional bias into components of towards, away and a temporal variability 
metric predicted PTSD symptoms post-deployment as a function of traumatic experiences, 
whereas traditional aggregate mean bias scores did not. Interestingly, the findings held true 
for all emotionally arousing stimuli (regardless of valence), which led the authors to 
cautiously imply a link between emotional dysregulation and attentional dysregulation. Swick 
and Ashley (2017) also investigated attentional bias variability (rather than static bias towards 
or away from threat) by comparing veterans with and without PTSD on a version of the dot 
probe task using neutral and emotional word stimuli; they found that participants with PTSD 
showed greater fluctuations in attentional bias than controls.  
 
Taken together, conflicting studies that have drawn different conclusions about the 
association between PTSD and attentional responses to threat may be reconciled by an 
account of attentional bias that emphasises dynamic rather than static processes and greater 
within-participant variability.  Moreover, this explanation may more accurately represent 
symptom clusters in PTSD. Avoidance symptoms may be understood in terms of attentional 
bias away from threat, whereas hypervigilance symptoms may be associated with excessive 




studies may have fluctuated between both extremes of attention allocation is consistent with 
both symptom clusters.  
 
One of the most promising aspects of research using the dot probe paradigm in the current 
review is the development of interventions that can both improve attention allocation and 
target PTSD symptoms. Khanna et al. (2016) wanted to determine whether systematically 
training attention away from threat (attentional bias modification; ABM) or improving 
flexibility and attentional control (attentional control training; ACT) is more effective, and 
thus administered each type of training programme to two respective groups of veterans with 
PTSD. The results suggested both types of training improved performance on the MST and 
ameliorated PTSD symptoms, with attentional control showing stronger effects than 
systematic attentional training away from threat. 
  
Two further studies in the current review investigated whether attentional training (using the 
dot probe task) could be used as a preventative measure for military personnel pre-
deployment, to reduce the likelihood of developing PTSD post-deployment, as opposed to 
a treatment for PTSD. Wald et al. (2016) randomly allocated 719 soldiers to one of four 
conditions: high-dose (eight sessions) ABM, low-dose ABM (four sessions), low dose ACT 
and no intervention. They found that only low-dose ABM produced significantly lower levels 
of post-deployment PTSD, and that these effects were sustained at follow-up. Given 
previous findings that the relationship between PTSD and attentional bias may be 
exacerbated by the degree of combat exposure (e.g. Sipos et al., 2014), Wald et al. (2017) 
conducted a further study utilising attention training as a preventative measure and found 
that ABM attenuated the relationship between traumatic exposure and stress-related 
symptoms (although it is worth noting that only a modest percentage of stress-related 
variance was accounted for by ABM).  
 
In summary, recent studies have investigated attentional bias in military personnel with and 
without PTSD using the dot probe paradigm. The main contribution of this research has 
been to measure attentional bias with a broader range of stimuli and to highlight the dynamic 
attentional processes involved in responding to threat. Lastly, studies have used the dot probe 
task as part of attentional training programmes, and these show some early promise as a 
preventative measure as well as a method of improving attentional bias and ameliorating 





3.3.2.3 Other paradigms used to investigate attentional bias in military PTSD  
The final four studies relating to attentional bias and military PTSD in the current systematic 
review have used alternative paradigms to MST and the dot probe task. Firstly, Pineles et al. 
(2007) highlighted that these tasks may not be pure measures of attentional bias, since 
interference could instead reflect other executive processes such as retrieval or response 
selection rather than difficulties specifically with the input stage of information processing. 
Moreover, these tasks cannot draw firm conclusions as to whether group differences are 
attributable to facilitated detection (greater ease finding threat-related stimuli) or interference 
(difficulty disengaging from threat stimuli). The authors instead emphasised the usefulness 
of visual search tasks, where a target stimulus is buried within an array of distractors and 
participants are required to detect the target. The ability to detect threat stimuli more quickly 
amongst neutral distractors is an example of facilitated detection, whereas detecting neutral 
stimuli more slowly amongst threat vs. neutral distractors is an example of interference. In 
their study, veterans high vs. low in PTSD symptoms engaged in a visual search task, whereby 
they detected the odd word out amongst distractors (by determining whether the target was 
a word or non-word) in either a facilitation or interference condition. Results found evidence 
for interference but not facilitation in the high vs. low PTSD groups. These findings were 
further supported by a second study (Armstrong et al., 2013) in which combat veterans with 
and without PTSD and nonveteran controls were presented with pairs of faces (one neutral, 
the other either happy, disgusted or fearful). Eye-tracking technology was used to assess both 
orienting bias (the proportion of trials in which participants initially focused on the emotional 
vs. neutral face, reflecting facilitated detection) and maintenance bias (the proportion of 
viewing time spent on emotional vs. neutral faces, reflecting difficulty disengaging). As with 
Pineles et al. (2007), the results indicated that participants with PTSD differed from controls 
with respect to difficulty disengaging but not facilitated detection. Thus, only veterans with 
PTSD maintained attention longer on negative vs. happy or neutral emotional faces and there 
were no group differences in orientation to emotional faces.  
 
By differentiating between interference and facilitation, the studies conducted by Pineles et 
al. (2007) and Armstrong et al. (2013) helpfully illuminate different subcomponents of 
attentional bias. However, both these studies focus on the temporal aspects (i.e. faster 
reaction time; longer duration spent engaging) as opposed to accuracy. In a third study, 
Olatunji et al. (2013) compared veterans with and without PTSD and nonveteran controls 
on a task in which images (combat, neutral, disgust and pleasant) were rapidly presented. 




to indicate whether or not a rotated image had been presented (detection) and to indicate 
which direction it was rotated in (accuracy). Combat veterans with PTSD had impaired 
accuracy relative to both control groups, but only when responding to target images 
following combat-related distractors. This provides further evidence for PTSD characterised 
by difficulty disengaging from threat.  
 
Rather than measuring attentional bias directly, the final study of this bias in the current 
review aimed to investigate whether the strategies people use in response to threatening 
stimuli might mediate the relationship between interference effects and PTSD. Wisco et al. 
(2013) highlighted research suggesting that deliberate suppression or avoidance may be 
maladaptive strategies that ultimately perpetuate PTSD symptoms, whereas approach-based 
strategies such as reappraising thoughts or asking for support are more helpful (e.g. Litman, 
2006). They proposed that maladaptive attempts to control unwanted threat-relevant 
thoughts may account for the relationship between difficulty withdrawing attention from 
threat and PTSD symptom severity. Thought suppression, worry and lack of social control 
were thought to be particularly maladaptive thought-control strategies that had been studied 
in relation to PTSD directly, but their relationship to attentional bias had been neglected. 
Thus, Wisco et al. (2013) administered measures of PTSD, and thought-control strategies to 
combat veterans. Participants also completed a visual search task as a measure of attentional 
interference. Mediational models were used to assess the relationships between variables. 
The findings suggested that thought control strategies fully mediated the relationship 
between attentional interference and PTSD symptoms, and that thought suppression and 
worry better account for the relationship between interference and PTSD than social control. 
Difficulty withdrawing attention from threat (as measured by a visual search task) was related 
to greater use of thought suppression and worry. Whilst most attentional bias research has 
emphasised bottom-up, implicit processes (such as reaction times) in PTSD, these findings 
may offer very preliminary evidence in relation to the role of top-down, thought-control 
strategies. However, further research is needed to examine this further.  
 
Taken together, in the current review, the majority of the 21 studies focusing on cognitive 
bias in military PTSD were focused on attentional bias. Earlier studies involved the modified 
Stroop task and consistently found an interference effect for trauma-related words. Later 
studies involved the dot probe task; several of these concluded that attentional responses to 
threat can be conceptualised as a dynamic process involving both bias towards and away 




personnel with PTSD had greater fluctuations in attentional bias than those without PTSD. 
Lastly, studies using visual search tasks and eye-tracking have suggested that attentional bias 
in PTSD is better characterised by interference effects, whereby people struggle to disengage 
from threat, than by facilitation effects, whereby people show enhanced ability to detect 
threat. There is also some preliminary evidence to suggest that the relationship between 
attentional bias and PTSD symptoms may be mediated by unhelpful cognitive strategies such 
as thought suppression and worry.  
 
3.3.3 Research relating to judgment biases in military PTSD  
Subjective risk bias (the tendency to perceive the future as threatening) and interpretation 
bias (the tendency to perceive current, ambiguous situations as threatening) are biases in 
judgment that have been implicated in PTSD (Constans, 2005), but there has historically 
been very little evidence examining this directly. It was therefore unsurprising that the current 
review was unable to unearth studies examining the relationship between judgment biases 
and PTSD in specifically military populations. To date, no studies appear to have examined 
subjective risk bias in military personnel with and without PTSD. Only one study has 
examined interpretation bias in this population. Kimble et al. (2002) employed a sentence 
completion task to examine interpretation bias in veterans with and without PTSD. The 
authors chose this task for its simplicity and adaptability, and because unlike tasks such as 
the MST, sentence completion permits examination of more volitional, explicit processes. 
Participants were presented with incomplete sentences where multiple endings were possible 
and asked to generate endings as quickly as possible. Veterans with PTSD produced 
significantly more military endings than non-military endings, regardless of combat exposure, 
which the authors argued was indicative of the relatively spontaneous accessibility of trauma 
information.  
 
Given the limited research, it is unclear whether negative or trauma-related interpretations 
are more readily activated or whether it is more difficult to suppress them (paralleling the 
facilitated detection vs. interference distinction in the attentional bias literature). It is also 
unclear whether any group differences would emerge in relation to alternative negative, non-
military stimuli. Nevertheless, there appears to be plenty of scope for future research 
involving more varied or dynamic stimuli (such as sentences, scenarios, scenes, video clips 





3.3.4 Quality assessment  
A subset of domains from a quality assessment tool (QATQ) and a research integrity 
checklist (RDFC) was selected for the purpose of this review (see Appendix). Each study 
included for qualitative synthesis was assigned a quality score on the basis of these domains; 
these are included in Table 3.2. 20% of the total studies were rated by a second assessor; 
interrater reliability was at 91.67%, with disagreements resolved through discussion. Each 
domain will now be discussed briefly.  
 
3.3.4.1 Selection bias (QATQ) 
Most studies in the current review were awarded a score of ‘moderate’. This is because they 
primarily recruited participants from specialist veterans’ services or from clinics. Only two 
studies were deemed ‘strong’ on this basis since they recruited from an entire battalion or 
region, and there therefore not sampled from a patient population.  Three studies were 
deemed to be ‘weak’, since they only recruited via self-referral, or did not describe their 
selection methods. Despite these mixed results, it should be noted that the present review 
deliberately focuses on a very specific, minority population that may not necessarily represent 
the general population and lower quality ratings in this domain may therefore reflect the 
inevitable challenge of recruiting a minority group.  
 
3.3.4.2 Confounders (QATQ) 
Most studies reviewed here (15/21) had controlled for their confounders (e.g. age, gender, 
ethnicity, education level etc.) and were thus awarded a ‘strong’ score. This was done either 
at recruitment (for example, only recruiting men since this is an accurate reflection of the 
military population with direct combat experience), through matching, or in the analysis (for 
example, including potentially confounding variables as covariates). One study had 
controlled for some confounding variables, but not others, and was scored as ‘moderate’. 
Five studies were deemed ‘weak’ on this domain since they had either failed to account for 
confounding variables in any way or had not disclosed potential confounds (e.g. failing to 
report any demographic information).  
 
3.3.4.3 Data collection (QATQ) 
This domain pertains to the reliability and validity of measures used in the studies reviewed. 
One study in the current review had poor reliability on one of its measures and was therefore 
scored as ‘moderate’ on this domain. However, the remaining 20 studies were scored as 




describe validity and reliability, PTSD is a commonly researched area with widely used tools 
(e.g. PTSD Checklist; PCL); validity and reliability had therefore been reported elsewhere.  
 
3.3.4.4 Hypotheses (RDFC) 
In the current review, three studies were scored as ‘moderate’ and one as ‘weak’; the 
remainder were scored as ‘strong’ since there were clearly described hypotheses, including an 
expected direction of effect. However, it is important to note that this checklist is primarily 
used by reviewers responding to pre-registered reports and it is therefore difficult to rule out 
whether hypotheses were actually specified prior to data collection.  
 
3.3.4.5 Variables (RDFC) 
All but one study were rated as ‘strong’ on this domain. This was they were relatively 
parsimonious in their design; they did not include multiple independent variables or measure 
the same variables in multiple different ways. The one exception was due to an excessively 
complex experimental design involving multiple manipulations of independent variables with 
multiple levels, which may have carried an inflated risk of Type I error. As stated above, it is 
of course difficult to exclude the possibility that additional, non-significant variables were 
dropped after the analysis.  
 
3.3.4.6 Power (RDFC) 
No study in the current review was given a ‘strong’ score for this domain, since non described 
a power-analysis or explicitly discussed a rationale for choosing the sample size. Five studies 
were rated as ‘weak’ since they were underpowered (Cohen, 1992) and had not raised this as 
a limitation of the research. The remaining 16 studies either had broadly appropriate sample 








4.1 OVERVIEW OF STUDIES  
The current report provides an up-to-date review of research articles examining cognitive 
biases in military personnel with and without PTSD. In line with previous research, the 
studies included in this review emphasise the role of three biases in particular: memory bias, 
attentional bias and judgment bias. The findings have been discussed above and broadly 
indicate that in comparison with military controls, military personnel with PTSD have a 
propensity to be overgeneral when describing autobiographical memories, they tend to find 
disengaging from threatening stimuli more challenging, they show greater fluctuation 
between bias towards and away from threat and they are likely to draw trauma-relevant, 
threatening conclusions when presented with ambiguous information. The relevance for 
specifically military populations, methodological limitations, recommendations for future 
research and implications for clinical practice will now be briefly discussed.  
 
4.2 IMPLICATIONS FOR MILITARY PTSD 
As described earlier, there are differences in how PTSD manifests linked to distinct sources 
of trauma. For military personnel with PTSD, traumatic events may have taken place during 
prolonged periods of stress in comparison with other, non-military events (such as road 
traffic accidents or assaults). There is also evidence to suggest that military personnel, 
particularly those occupying a combat role, are at increased risk of developing PTSD (Fear 
et al., 2010), their symptoms may be more severe (e.g. Brinker et al., 2007), and they may 
experience difficulties in relation to identity, social role and adjustment when returning to 
civilian life (e.g. Brewin et al., 2011). How do the current studies elucidate military-specific 
aspects of PTSD?  
 
Increased responding to even minor threat cues has been conceptualised as serving an 
adaptive function in the context of war (Wald et al., 2016). The literature suggests that one 
component of attentional bias is facilitated threat detection, whereby people are able to 
notice danger more quickly (e.g. Pineles et al., 2007). It could be argued that a heuristic that 
enables people to notice potential threats in the environment more readily serves an adaptive 
function: protecting them from harm. In contrast, in the current studies, those with PTSD 
did not demonstrate enhanced detection; they instead found disengaging from threat more 
difficult. This could be considered a maladaptive attentional bias. Sipos et al. (2014) also 




combat exposure, which suggests that cognitive biases may arise from a complex interplay 
between PTSD symptoms and military experiences. Comparing military personnel with 
PTSD against those without PTSD and also civilian controls may thus be a helpful way to 
differentiate between maladaptive attention to threat as part of general PTSD 
symptomatology and a potentially more adaptive attentional bias linked to combat exposure. 
However, only three studies in the current review did so, and these did not find evidence 
that the military control groups had enhanced threat detection relative to civilian controls. 
These findings may indicate that enduring attentional bias is specific to PTSD 
symptomatology rather than combat exposure. It may of course be the case that some 
enhanced detection of threat exists for military controls whilst at war, but this attenuates 
after returning home. This would evidently be adaptive since it describes attention allocation 
fluctuating to match the objective danger present in the environment.  
 
A final finding from the current review that pertains specifically to military PTSD was a post-
hoc observation in one study that wearing war regalia exacerbated overgeneral 
autobiographical memory (McNally et al., 1995). It is worth noting that PTSD is 
characterised by avoidance of traumatic reminders; wearing war regalia could potentially 
indicate that symptoms are less severe, although this does not account for the exacerbation 
of overgeneral memory bias (which has been previously linked with PTSD; Wessel et al., 
2002). One simple explanation that does account for this is that deliberately wearing 
reminders of war may makes war-related trauma memories more easily accessible. However, 
the causal direction is unclear; given that military PTSD is linked with loss of identity, role 
change and adjustment difficulties, it is possible that those with symptoms are more likely to 
continue to wear war regalia to connect with their military identity.  
 
Bringing together the conclusions from the studies in the current review offers some 
tentative early hypotheses about the role of cognitive biases in military PTSD. However, 
surprisingly few research articles discussed the specific relevance of recruiting military 
participants and there is considerable scope for this to be examined further in future research.  
 
4.3 LIMITATIONS 
One significant limitation of the studies reviewed was the lack of ecological validity. With 
the exception of two studies examining autobiographical memory, the research described 
typically used abstract experimental paradigms such as the modified Stroop and dot probe 




delineating the nature of cognitive biases in military PTSD. However, there is a paucity of 
work using ecologically valid tasks that reflect naturalistic settings that present commonplace 
demands. In reality, military personnel (both currently and previously serving) are frequently 
required to make judgments based on what they experience in the world around them and 
tasks that involve lexical decision-making, sentence completion, forced-choice responses or 
eye-tracking may not adequately capture these demands. This limitation applies to not only 
experimental tasks investigating cognitive biases in military PTSD but also to training 
programmes designed to reduce bias and, by extension, to ameliorate PTSD symptoms. A 
subset of the studies described in the current review involved bias modification training 
programmes and reported promising results, but these sorts of cognitive paradigms are 
unlikely to transfer to real-world settings.   
 
A second methodological limitation was the task validity; the extent to which the paradigms 
were genuinely tapping into distinct cognitive constructs is unclear. For example, in studies 
of memory bias, implicit and explicit memory were differentiated only on the basis of 
whether or not a clear instruction to recall previously presented words was given. Moreover, 
small differences in reaction times may be sensitive to subtle variation in factors such as word 
length, frequency of use or degree of emotionality. Whilst some of the more recent studies 
reviewed here have attempted to address this limitation (e.g. Khanna et al., 2016), the 
majority do not attempt to do so.  
 
Finally, it is important to consider the limitations of the current systematic review. The first 
pertains to the quality assessment process. Many quality assessment tools are designed to 
evaluate RCTs and other studies exploring the efficacy of treatment and few exist to evaluate 
more basic, mechanistic experimental research. This meant that a small subset of domains 
on the QATQ was relevant for the included studies. The RDFC offered some additional 
domains, but (as described elsewhere) it is difficult to draw firm conclusions about research 
practices post-hoc. It should also be noted that only a subset of articles was rated by a second 
researcher. It would have been ideal to double-rate all included articles, although it is 
reassuring that there was a high degree of agreement between raters. Finally, the initial 
retrieval of studies was carried out by one researcher. In future reviews it might be helpful 
and reduce bias if a second researcher confirmed the decision to include or exclude studies, 






4.4 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
4.4.1 Research priorities  
A number of potential recommendations emerged from the studies reviewed. Firstly, as 
discussed above, future studies should consider including military and civilian control groups, 
and ideally also people with PTSD stemming from non-military sources. Secondly, more 
ecologically valid measures of cognitive bias should be developed. This might involve the 
use of a broader range of stimuli that more accurately reflect the rich, detailed and dynamic 
environments in which people with PTSD originally experienced traumatic events, including 
vignettes and audio/video clips. Future tasks could also involve more everyday types of 
threat, since it is unclear whether group differences are diminished when combat-specific 
reminders are removed. Thirdly, as described above, studies of cognitive bias in military 
PTSD have predominantly focused on attentional bias. Few have also explored memory bias. 
However, virtually no studies have been conducted examining judgment biases such as 
subjective risk bias and interpretation bias. Given that PTSD, along with other anxiety 
disorders, is heavily associated with misinterpretation of events, it is surprising that so few 
studies have explored this area. Although Kimble et al. (2002) found evidence for 
interpretation bias using a word stem completion task, it is unclear whether this truly reflects 
threatening interpretations of ambiguous information or vigilance to threat, as opposed to 
stronger associative priming for combat-related words or rumination about war in those with 
PTSD. Therefore, there is ample scope for future research to focus on judgment biases in 
military PTSD.  
 
Lastly, it is worth noting that participants in 86% of the studies included in the current review 
were members of the US Armed Forces. None involved members of the British armed 
forces. Studies of recent conflicts estimate that PTSD is less prevalent amongst British versus 
US veterans (Richardson et al., 2010). These differences are thought to be partly attributable 
to sampling, measurement and diagnostic issues, but sociological and cultural factors should 
also not be neglected (Richardson et al., 2010). It is therefore imperative that future research 
into the relationship between cognitive biases and military PTSD involves members of the 
British armed forces, as well as armed forces from other countries.  
 
4.4.2 Recommendations for quality improvement  
The studies in the current review generally scored reasonably well on the QATQ domains. 
However, one key recommendation that emerged from the quality assessment was the 




planned analysis), since studies that lost points on the QATQ domains tended to lack a 
strategy for doing so. The RDFC tool was selected as a means of assessing the veracity of 
decisions made by researchers that can affect the quality of research. One clear finding to 
emerge from this aspect of the quality assessment was that a power analysis or justification 
for sample size was lacking across all studies. It is recommended that this is included in future 
studies, since lack of statistical power is likely to create bias and thus inflate the likelihood of 
a type I error (see Wicherts et al., 2016 for a review). With the exception of this 
recommendation, quality assessment using the RDFC presented a challenge. Although the 
checklist describes a number of excellent ideals for research integrity, it is very difficult to 
ascertain whether these standards have been met after a paper has been published. As 
described above, hypotheses could be specified after the research findings are known, or 
multiple additional variables could be dropped prior to publication, alongside a host of other 
‘questionable research practices’ (e.g. Fielder & Schwarz, 2016). It should be recognised that 
questions about research integrity have in part arisen as part of a systemic failure; only a small 
proportion of research articles submitted to peer-reviewed journals result in publication, and 
there is an overwhelming appetite for significant findings. One tentative recommendation to 
improve quality of future studies is to pre-register studies prior to beginning data collection, 
since this could have a role in reducing questionable research practices (Chambers et al., 
2014). It is also recommended that further quality assessment tools that specifically evaluate 
the quality of more experimental research are developed for future systematic reviews.   
 
4.5 IMPLICATIONS FOR CLINICAL PRACTICE  
The focus of the current review was to examine the literature relating to cognitive biases in 
military personnel with PTSD. The studies yielded from the search involved military 
personnel with and without PTSD completing various experimental tasks. Given the 
mechanistic nature of the research reviewed, there are few direct recommendations for 
clinical practice. However, the findings might have some tentative clinical implications, 
which will now be briefly discussed.  
 
The key findings from the current review could inform existing packages of support. Most 
interventions for PTSD in the general population include an early psychoeducation 
component, whereby individuals are encouraged to learn about the mechanisms 
underpinning the development and maintenance of their symptoms. For military personnel, 
a variety of post-operational stress management programmes have been developed as a 




and promoting successful reintegration into civilian life (e.g. Greenberg et al., 2010; Frappell-
Cooke et al., 2010; Fertout et al., 2011). The findings from the current review might add to 
these various programmes of support. Specifically, findings suggesting that it is common for 
people with PTSD to pay excessive attention to threat, to struggle to disengage from 
threatening stimuli and to draw threatening conclusions when a situation is ambiguous might 
help to normalise symptoms and reduce stigma, distress and confusion. There were also 
findings suggesting that military personnel with PTSD were able to habituate to threat-stimuli 
(albeit at a delayed rate). This is consistent with the effectiveness of interventions such as 
exposure therapy, thus lending further support to current-evidence-based treatments.  
 
Finally, a tentative clinical implication of the current review findings pertains to the use of 
experimental paradigms (e.g. dot-probe) as a training programme, with evidence from a small 
number of studies suggesting that training was associated with a reduction in both attentional 
bias and PTSD symptoms. Two types of training programme have been used: attentional 
bias modification (ABM) and attentional control training (ACT).  Arguably, ACT has greater 
theoretical merit; the literature suggests that attentional bias is characterised by fluctuations 
towards and away from threat, which suggests an intervention that promotes attentional 
control is superior to one that consistently trains attention away from threat. However, both 
interventions have led to improvements. In one study that measured attentional bias before 
and after deployment, ACT, a low dose of ABM and a high dose of ABM were directly 
contrasted in training sessions that took place prior to deployment. The low-dose (i.e. fewer 
sessions) of ABM was most successful (Wald et al., 2016). The reasons for this are not clear. 
One possibility is that ACT is more effective after symptoms have developed and ABM as a 
preventative measure. Another possibility is that the low-dose was more acceptable to 
patients than a high dose; repeatedly responding to a target dot on the dot probe task may 
have led to difficulties sustaining interest and engagement across eight sessions. This is 
supported by the fact that many of the studies investigating the effects of attentional bias 
training programmes led to relatively high drop-out rates. Given the ambiguity in the 
literature, further research to clarify the optimal training programme is needed. Moreover, 
there was no follow-up in these studies to indicate that the symptom-reducing effects of 
training were enduring.  
 
In summary, although further research is needed before any firm recommendations for 
clinical practice can be made, the findings from the current review could be used to support 




programmes as a means of reducing both cognitive bias and PTSD symptoms. In the future, 
it will be important to develop a broader range of PTSD intervention tools, based on the 
cognitive bias research, that are both feasible and acceptable to military personnel pre and 
post deployment.  
 
4.6 CONCLUDING COMMENTS  
In the current review, examining studies that purport to measure differences in cognitive bias 
between military personnel with and without PTSD provided further evidence for the role 
of biases in memory, attention and judgment in those with the disorder. The review also 
helped to elucidate the extent to which PTSD symptoms versus combat exposure play a role, 
although it highlighted that further work is needed in this area. Some of the mechanisms 
underpinning these biases, such as threat detection and interference effects, were explored, 
and the implications for treatment were discussed. However, this review also revealed 
significant limitations in the current literature, whereby tasks have high laboratory control 
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Background: Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) is a debilitating mental health disorder 
characterised by intrusive memories, avoidance of traumatic reminders, and hyperarousal in 
the aftermath of a traumatic event. Symptom profiles may vary depending on the nature and 
duration of the traumatic event. Deployed combat personnel often experience prolonged 
periods of stress and are thought to be at increased risk of PTSD. Their symptoms can also 
be more severe, chronic and treatment-resistant than in the general population. 
Interpretation bias describes a systematic tendency to judge ambiguous information to be 
negative or threatening in nature and is thought to be more common in people with PTSD. 
However, for combat personnel, interpreting ambiguous information as potentially 
threatening whilst deployed is highly adaptive and a helpful way to remain safe. The extent 
to which interpretation bias in combat personnel can be considered pathological, and linked 
with PTSD symptoms, rather than an inevitable aspect of the combat role is thus unclear.  
 
Method: In order to investigate the above question, 20 combat veterans with PTSD, 22 
veterans without PTSD and 20 civilians without PTSD completed the Bodily Sensations 
Interpretations Questionnaire (BSIQ). This task required participants to read brief scenarios 
describing ambiguous situations. Participants firstly generated their own explanations for the 
situation and were then presented with different possible explanations, one of which was 
negative, and both ranked and rated these explanations in terms of likelihood. In an extension 
of the original task, participants were also asked to imagine that the worst-case scenario was 
true and to make judgments about what the future would be like and about their ability to 
cope.  
 
Results: The findings revealed that in comparison with both veteran and civilian controls, 
combat veterans with PTSD generated more negative explanations for ambiguous situations, 
judged negative interpretations to be more likely and felt less able to cope with the worst-
case scenario. Veterans with versus without PTSD were also more likely to judge the worst-
case scenario to have more severe and insurmountable consequences for the future, although 
they did not differ significantly from the civilian group in this regard. Lastly, the combat and 
civilian control groups did not differ in their responses, with one exception: combat veterans 





Conclusions: The current study comprised a number of novel aspects. Firstly, it investigated 
interpretation bias, which has been relatively understudied in comparison with other 
cognitive biases (such as attentional bias). Secondly, tasks commonly used to investigate 
cognitive bias offer a high level of experimental control but as a result tend to be abstract in 
nature; the current study used a task with relatively good ecological validity. Lastly, the 
current study expands understanding of specifically combat-related PTSD. The findings 
suggest that interpretation bias in combat-related PTSD is likely to be associated with PTSD 
symptoms rather than combat exposure. The findings also indicate that combat veterans 
without PTSD may be particularly resilient and able to cope with everyday adversity. The 
findings are discussed in relation to a prominent model of PTSD, and the potential 







1.1 OUTLINE OF INTRODUCTION 
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) is a debilitating mental health disorder characterised 
by intrusive symptoms, persistent avoidance, negative alterations in cognitions in mood and 
alterations in physiological arousal or reactivity following traumatic event (DSM-V; American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013). Combat veterans are at increased risk of developing PTSD, 
and the symptoms are often more severe than in the general population (Stevelink et al., 
2018). In order to provide an overview of relevant literature and the rationale for the current 
study, the introduction will firstly present a historical perspective on emotional distress 
following trauma. It will then describe current diagnostic criteria, risk factors, assessment and 
treatment of PTSD. The merits of examining PTSD in combat personnel will then be 
discussed in detail, with specific reference to a cognitive model of PTSD. Lastly, the aims 
and hypotheses of the current study will be presented.   
 
1.2 OVERVIEW OF PTSD 
1.2.1 Historical perspectives on PTSD 
Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is characterised by ongoing intrusive re-experiencing, 
avoidance, changes in cognition and mood (e.g. difficulties recalling the traumatic event, 
persistent negative emotional state) and hyperarousal in the aftermath of a traumatic event. 
Traumatic events are defined as directly experienced or witnessed exposure to actual or 
threatened death, serious injury, or sexual violence (American Psychiatric Association, 2013).  
The concept of PTSD largely has its roots in the experiences of military personnel, with 
physical and psychological manifestations of soldiers’ emotional distress widely reported for 
centuries (Jones, 2013). These include psychosomatic symptoms such as palpitations and 
tremor, neurological symptoms (without apparent organic basis) such as confusion and 
fatigue, and affective symptoms such as low mood (Jones, 1995). Before the 20th century, 
clinical syndromes such as irritable heart, wind contusions, nostalgia and melancholia were 
used to describe these symptoms (Jones and Wessely, 2005). The concept of ‘shell-shock’ 
emerged after the first world-war, and pertained to a heterogenous set of complaints, 
including fatigue, poor sleep, nightmares, hyperarousal, and functional impairment (e.g. 
deficits in memory or sensory perception; paralysis). Attempts to treat shell-shock 




intense psychological distress, and to the rapid expansion of the field of military psychiatry 
(Jones and Wessely, 2005). Shell shock has thus been conceptualised as a precursor to PTSD 
(e.g. Crocq & Crocq, 2000). 
 
PTSD was formally recognised as a mental health disorder in 1980, when it was included in 
the third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) 
following research into the difficulties experienced by Vietnam war veterans, Holocaust 
survivors, sexual trauma survivors and others (US Department of Veterans Affairs). This 
formed the foundation of much of our present-day understanding of PTSD. 
 
1.2.2 Current conceptualisation of PTSD 
1.2.2.1 Diagnostic criteria 
The diagnostic criteria for PTSD as described in the most recent edition of DSM (DSM-V; 
American Psychiatric Association, 2013) are as follows: 
• Exposure to actual or threatened death, serious injury or sexual violence (either 
directly or indirectly, for example by witnessing the event occur to others or by 
learning that the event was experienced by a loved one). 
• Intrusive symptoms, such as recurrent, involuntary memories, flashbacks, 
nightmares, and intense or prolonged psychological or physiological distress 
triggered by reminders of the event. 
•  Persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with the traumatic event. This may involve 
avoiding internal reminders (such as memories, thoughts or feelings that relate to the 
event) and external reminders (such as people, places, conversations, activities etc. 
that are associated with the event).  
• Negative alterations in cognitions and mood. These include: an inability to recall 
aspects of the traumatic event, exaggerated negative beliefs about oneself, others or 
the world, beliefs about the causes of the event that lead a person to blame 
themselves or other people, low mood and other negative emotional states (such as 
guilt or shame), diminished interest in enjoyable activities and feelings of 
estrangement or detachment from others.  
• Alterations in physiological arousal or reactivity. This may involve increased 
irritability, anger or aggression, reckless or self-destructive behaviour, hypervigilance, 





These difficulties must be present for a minimum of one month, cause significant distress 
and functional impairment, and must not be attributable to substance misuse or an alternative 
medical condition.  
 
1.2.2.2 Risk Factors  
In the UK, one in three people report having experienced at least one traumatic event 
(Mental Health Foundation). Many of these individuals are likely to experience PTSD-like 
symptoms, referred to as an ‘acute stress response’ for the first month (Royal College of 
Psychiatrists, 2015). However, these symptoms generally attenuate, with only a small 
proportion of trauma-survivors going on to develop PTSD (e.g. Greenberg et al., 2015).  
 
A number of factors might increase the risk of developing PTSD. Early, pre-traumatic risk 
factors that are thought to be particularly relevant include a family history of mental disorder, 
early experience of trauma, negative parenting experiences and lower education (e.g. Shalev, 
1996). However, risk factors pertaining to the peri and post-traumatic period are thought to 
have stronger effects than these pre-traumatic factors (Brewin et al., 2000). Aspects of the 
trauma period itself include trauma severity, perceived threat to life, negative emotional 
responses, and in particular, dissociation during the trauma (Ozer et al., 2003).With respect 
to post-traumatic risk factors, the number of life stressors faced by individuals (e.g. Brewin 
et al., 2000) and the availability and quality of social support (e.g. Harvey et al., 2011) are 
thought to be of importance. 
 
1.2.2.3 Assessment  
PTSD is assessed by clinicians using a combination of measures that map onto DSM 
diagnostic criteria. Self-report measures include the Impact of Event Scale (IES; Horrowitz 
et al., 1979), the Post-traumatic Diagnostic Scale (PDS; Foa et al., 1997), and the PTSD 
Checklist (PCL; Weathers & Ford 1996). These measures invite respondents to specify the 
frequency and/or severity of PTSD symptoms. Interview schedules include the Clinician 
Administered PTSD Scale (CAPS; Blake et al., 1995) and the PTSD Symptom Scale – 
Interview version (PSS-I; Foa et al., 1993). All these measures have good reliability and 
validity and are frequently used in both research and clinical contexts (National Collaborating 
Centre for Mental Health, 2005). The PCL is often used in military mental health research, 






1.2.2.4 Treatment  
The evidence base (e.g. Cusack et al., 2016; NICE, 2018) supports two main approaches to 
the treatment of PTSD: trauma-focused cognitive behavioural therapy (TF-CBT) and eye 
movement desensitisation and reprocessing (EMDR). TF-CBT is an evidence-based 
approach that involves multiple components. Psychoeducation is provided to normalise 
PTSD symptoms and explain the rationale for the treatment approach. Behavioural aspects 
of TF-CBT may include both imaginal and in vivo exposure. Imaginal exposure entails 
confronting trauma memories by providing a detailed narrative account of the event(s) in 
chronological order whilst describing perceptions, thoughts and feelings experienced at the 
time of the trauma. This process is repeated until recounting the event no longer evokes high 
levels of distress and the trauma is experienced as a memory rather than a current threat. In 
vivo exposure involves confronting situations, people, places or objects that were previously 
avoided because they were associated with traumatic events or elicited strong emotional 
reactions. Repeated in vivo exposure enables people to realise that the feared situation no 
longer poses a threat. Cognitive aspects of TF-CBT involve identifying negative cognitions 
or beliefs about the self, other people or the world that are associated with traumatic events 
(e.g. “it’s my fault that it happened”, “other people will try and hurt me” or “the world is 
fundamentally dangerous). These cognitions can lead to the overestimation of threat. 
Trauma-related cognitions are gently challenged, for example by exploring evidence for and 
against and by testing out predictions about the inevitability of danger.  
 
EMDR shares a number of features with TF-CBT. EMDR also involves imaginal exposure, 
desensitisation and challenging negative cognitions, but combines these processes with 
‘rhythmic bilateral physical stimulation’ (for example, moving one’s eyes from side to side, 
tapping both hands or listening to tonal sounds; Shapiro, 1989). The proposed function of 
this stimulation is to distance the individual from their traumatic memories by reinforcing 
the notion that the memory is in the past and incongruent with current experiences (e.g. 
Brewin, 2003). Despite the evidence in support of EMDR (e.g. Cusack et al., 2016) and its 
designation as a distinct treatment approach involving specialised training, the degree of 
overlap with TF-CBT has led reviews to conclude that the effectiveness is mostly likely due 
to common treatment components rather than bilateral stimulation (e.g. Davidson & Parker, 
2001; National Collaborating Centre for Mental Health, 2005). However, a more recent 
systematic review concluded that bilateral stimulation may reduce distress associated with 




tolerable, and therefore that the use of EMDR over TF-CBT should be a matter of service-
user choice and clinician expertise (Jeffries & Davis, 2013).  
 
Another approach to the treatment of PTSD is Narrative Exposure Therapy (NET). This is 
a newer intervention that may be offered as a variant of TF-CBT (NICE, 2018). It was 
developed as a means of supporting victims of organised violence and has been used 
extensively with asylum seekers and refugees in both high-income and low-income countries 
(Robjant & Fazel, 2010). NET entails people developing a chronological narrative of their 
entire life, concentrating in great detail on traumatic events (similar to imaginal exposure in 
traditional TF-CBT) but also incorporating more positive memories. This approach is 
designed to process and contextualise traumatic events, addressing core symptoms of PTSD, 
whilst simultaneously cultivating a sense of personal identity and highlighting strengths and 
resources. 
 
The choice of which treatment approach to adopt depends in part on the type of traumatic 
event. This is because people who have PTSD stemming from different sources of trauma 
may present with distinct symptom profiles. For instance, people who have experienced 
natural disasters may be most likely to view the world as unjust and unpredictable (e.g.  Garcia 
et al., 2015) and may be facing severe and enduring social and economic consequences (such 
as the loss of one’s home).  Alternatively, survivors of an assault may have strongly-held 
beliefs about others as dangerous and untrustworthy or about themselves as weak or 
defective in some way (e.g. Ali et al., 2002). PTSD symptoms for assault-survivors can also 
vary depending on the type and severity of assault (Hembree et al., 2004). In general, PTSD 
is more likely to arise from intentional acts of interpersonal violence, especially combat and 
sexual assault, than from accidents or natural disasters (e.g. Creamer et al., 2001). 
 
PTSD presentation may also vary depending on the number of traumas; this also has 
implications for treatment. For instance, one-off events are typically treated with TF-CBT 
(NICE, 2018). However, for people who have experienced multiple traumatic events over a 
prolonged duration, the guidance is less clear-cut. As described above, there is emerging 
evidence for NET for people with this sort of trauma history (Robjant & Fazel, 2010) but 
there are no formal recommendations regarding treatment. The most recent version of the 
International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems (ICD-11; 
World Health Organisation, 2018) has included ‘Complex PTSD’ (CPTSD) as a diagnostic 




exposure to an event or series of events of an extremely threatening or horrific nature, most 
commonly prolonged or repetitive events from which escape is difficult or impossible (e.g., 
torture, slavery, genocide campaigns, prolonged domestic violence, repeated childhood 
sexual or physical abuse). All diagnostic requirements for PTSD are met. In addition, 
Complex PTSD is characterised by severe and persistent 1) problems in affect regulation; 2) 
beliefs about oneself as diminished, defeated or worthless, accompanied by feelings of 
shame, guilt or failure related to the traumatic event; and 3) difficulties in sustaining 
relationships and in feeling close to others. These symptoms cause significant impairment in 
personal, family, social, educational, occupational or other important areas of functioning” 
(World Health Organisation, 2018). The recognition of complex PTSD as a distinct disorder 
with a unique symptom profile may help to promote research in this area and ultimately to 
develop evidence-based recommendations for treatment. Given that CPTSD is most 
common following chronic, repeated interpersonal trauma (e.g. Forbes et al., 2012), it may 
be a relevant concept when considering PTSD in military personnel.  
 
Taken together, there is substantial heterogeneity within the concept of PTSD, depending 
on type and number of traumatic events, duration, and consequences for emotion regulation, 
sense of identity and relationships with others. It is therefore important to ensure that 
assessment and interventions are suitably matched to specific trauma type. 
 
1.3 COMBAT-RELATED PTSD 
1.3.1 Focus on combat exposure within military personnel 
The armed forces are a highly heterogenous group. The demands on people and the risks 
inherent in different sectors (e.g. Royal Navy, Army and Royal Air Force) and for different 
roles (e.g. technicians, infantry soldiers, army nurses) are unlikely to be comparable and there 
is a danger of oversimplification (DeVries & Wijnans, 2013). This heterogeneity in roles and 
responsibilities translates into different rates of PTSD; the prevalence of PTSD across the 
armed forces is estimated to be 4%, but rates increase to 7% when considering only those 
who occupy a combat role (Fear et al., 2010). Recent research suggests that the prevalence 
of PTSD is increasing (Stevelink et al., 2018) and that combat exposure is a specific risk 
factor (Fertout et al., 2011; Xue et al., 2015). Given the strength of the association between 
combat exposure and PTSD, the remainder of this literature review and the current research 






1.3.2 Combat-related risk factors  
Why might combat personnel be particularly at risk? For any deployed military personnel, 
austere living conditions, prolonged periods of separation from one’s family and/or civilian 
lifestyle and the number and length of deployments are associated with an increased risk of 
PTSD (Fertout et al., 2011; Xue et al., 2015). With respect to combat personnel, they are 
subject to these general military-wide risk factors, but their role means that they are also more 
likely to encounter situations involving threat of death or serious injury that are by definition 
considered to be traumatic events. In the context of armed combat, discharging a weapon, 
experiencing a subjective sense of threat or ‘mental defeat’ (whereby people mentally ‘give 
up’ during trauma; Wilker et al., 2017) are all thought to increase the risk of developing PTSD 
(Xue et al., 2015; Alvarez-Conrad et al., 2001; Ehlers et al., 2000). Lastly, combat veterans 
are at risk of encountering potentially morally injurious experiences (PMIEs; Williamson et 
al., 2018). Moral injury refers to strong emotional responses (such as guilt, anger or disgust; 
Farnsworth et al., 2014) experienced by people who have perpetrated, witnessed, learned 
about or failed to prevent “acts that transgress deeply held moral beliefs and expectations” 
(Litz et al., 2009). Although further research is needed, recent evidence has drawn a tentative 
association between exposure to PMIEs and mental health disorders (Williamson et al., 
2018).  
 
1.3.3 PTSD presentation in combat personnel  
How does PTSD manifest in combat veterans? In addition to increased risk and prevalence 
of PTSD, this population is also thought to experience more severe symptoms in comparison 
with civilians exposed to traumatic events of a similar magnitude (e.g. Brinker et al., 2007). 
For instance, research studies have found that people hospitalised due to combat are more 
likely to report re-experiencing and hyperarousal than those hospitalised for other traumatic 
events (Gaylord et al., 2004). Hyperarousal in particular is a prominent characteristic of 
PTSD, regardless of source of trauma, occurring in 70% of cases (Weston, 2014). Moreover, 
longitudinal research has found that hyperarousal may exacerbate other symptom clusters 
(such as re-experiencing), and stronger baseline hyperarousal following trauma has been 
linked with worse long-term outcomes (Schell et al., 2004). There is evidence to suggest that 
hyperarousal is especially relevant for combat-related PTSD, with combat veterans more 
likely to experience hyperarousal than people with PTSD stemming from other sources, 
including sexual abuse (Henigsberg et al., 2001). However, the relationship between combat-
related PTSD and hyperarousal is complex. For instance, Kimble et al. (2013) found that 




soldiers without PTSD had the least), combat soldiers without PTSD demonstrated 
hypervigilance to a similar extent to non-combat soldiers with PTSD. This led the authors 
to conclude that hypervigilance is a likely consequence of combat exposure, regardless of the 
development of PTSD, and therefore should not be excessively pathologised in a military 
sample. This is because whilst hypervigilance could be considered maladaptive for people 
who have suffered a one-off trauma, warzones are inherently threatening, and soldiers are 
trained to attend to, detect, and respond appropriately to threats. Therefore, the relative 
contributions of PTSD vs. combat exposure to the experience of hyperarousal are unclear 
and further research is needed to disentangle these factors.  
 
Another factor that differentiates combat personnel from other groups is treatment 
response: combat veterans take longer to seek help and have poorer treatment responses 
relative to both civilians and military personnel occupying a non-combat role (Murphy & 
Smith, 2018). There are many possible reasons for this; perceived barriers to seeking support 
include career concerns, worries about confidentiality, and not wishing to relive traumatic 
experiences. Even amongst those who do seek support, there is often significant complexity 
in presentation which can contribute to poor treatment response. For instance, one study 
found that 32% of those with PTSD met criteria for three other health outcomes (e.g. 
depression, anxiety, anger, or substance misuse; Murphy et al., 2017). However, stigma, 
concerns about clinicians’ understanding of military culture, and the challenges of 
reintegration into civilian life have been highlighted as prominent reasons for poor outcomes 
in combat veterans with PTSD. These will now be considered in turn.  
 
1.3.3.1 Stigma and attitudes to mental health  
Challenges around stigma are of course not unique to the military, nor to PTSD; many 
civilian adults presenting with a range of mental health difficulties do not seek support (Adult 
Psychiatric Morbidity Survey, 2014). Nonetheless, it is important to consider the role of 
stigma in relation to combat-related PTSD. Significant numbers of UK combat personnel 
(77%) with mental health difficulties do not seek or receive treatment, often citing concerns 
about the possibility of stigmatisation (Hoge et al., 2004). These concerns about stigma may 
stem from pervasive attitudes towards mental health within military populations. For 
instance, stigma used to be actively encouraged, with the phrase “lack of moral fibre” 
deliberately being coined during the second world war in order to discourage disobedience 
or conscientious objection to war (Jones, 2006). Indeed, Wertsch (1991) argues that secrecy, 




give the impression of being able to handle any stressor or burden; this results in a reluctance 
to acknowledge difficulties or seek help. Forbes et al. (2013) compared attitudes towards 
mental health in both military and civilian populations. Whilst both groups were generally 
accepting of mental health difficulties, participants in the military versus civilian group more 
likely to believe that causes were lack of self-discipline and will-power and less likely to 
endorse the view that mental health is on a par with physical health. Research has also found 
that military personnel (regardless of combat role) are less likely to attend their first 
psychology session as opposed to other medical appointments (Murphy & Busuttil, 2014), 
offering further evidence that physical illnesses are viewed as more legitimate than mental 
health difficulties within military populations.  
 
1.3.3.2 Clinicians’ understanding of military culture  
The armed forces operate within distinct set of laws, norms, traditions and values and 
provide its members with a shared cultural identity (e.g. Coll et al., 2010). It has been argued 
that any clinicians working with military personnel must demonstrate an understanding of 
and respect for military culture (Hall, 2013). This is especially importance since there is a lack 
of trust in those providing mental health support (French et al., 2004), and military personnel 
tend to favour peer support (Murphy & Busuttil, 2014). How might a lack of understanding 
of military culture adversely affect engagement and treatment response? One example comes 
from Brim (2013), who argues that “warrior ethos” is central to military culture. This 
promotes self-sacrifice, emotion suppression and pain tolerance and directly contrasts with 
a civilian or healthcare culture that espouses the importance of seeking help, expressing 
emotions and reducing pain. These fundamental differences between civilian and military 
ethos should be recognised and respected. A failure to do so runs the risk of pathologising 
thoughts, emotions and behaviours that are representative of military culture, and therefore 
potentially alienating clientele and reinforcing stigma.  
 
1.3.3.3 Challenges reintegrating into civilian life 
Whilst many combat veterans adjust successfully when returning to civilian life, some may 
face significant challenges in relation to reintegration. These include difficulties with combat 
veterans’ relationships with others, with many reporting feeling alienated and unable to relate 
to friends, family or spouses (e.g. Gold et al., 2007; Hall, 2013). Combat veterans may also 
struggle with resuming their roles within the community (Doyle & Peterson, 2005), with 
obtaining or sustaining employment, and with substance misuse (Maguen et al., 2009). 




or a feeling of leading a ‘double life’ or having separate identities (Brewin et al., 2011; Hall, 
2013). These adjustment difficulties have been conceptualised as a series of specific 
paradoxes, many of which map onto key characteristics of PTSD (Castro et al., 2015). For 
instance, hyperarousal corresponds with the ‘Morpheus paradox’, which occurs when 
military personnel returning from deployment may simultaneously feel physically and 
mentally exhausted but cannot sleep and are constantly on edge. Threat vigilance and 
avoidance correspond with the ‘safety paradox’, whereby people may feel as though they 
survived, and therefore that nothing can harm them, whilst simultaneously feeling as though 
the world is an unsafe place and they can never turn their back on anyone.  
 
Although warzone-related difficulties such as social isolation or poor unit cohesion are 
associated with negative health outcomes, veterans with PTSD are also adversely affected by 
difficulties at home (Iversen et al., 2005). Supporting combat veterans to reintegrate is thus 
of vital importance, and significant efforts have gone into developing packages of support 
that facilitate adjustment and mitigate the risks of developing mental health difficulties.  
 
What post-operational stress management programmes have been developed in order to 
prevent psychological ill health and promote reintegration amongst combat personnel? 
Firstly, a mandatory component of tours of duty for combat soldiers within the UK is 
‘decompression’: a period of structured, supportive and yet informal ‘unwinding’, generally 
in a neutral location (neither home nor the region of deployment). Secondly, Trauma Risk 
Management (TRiM) involves engaging with personnel immediately after exposure, as well 
as four weeks and three months later. This follow-up is key, since nearly half of all cases of 
military PTSD are of delayed onset (Goodwin et al., 2012). This programme aims to identify 
those at risk of developing mental health problems and to counteract difficulties with help-
seeking, resulting from mental health stigma (Greenberg et al., 2008). There is evidence to 
suggest that TRiM boosts resilience (Frappell-Cooke et al. 2010) and that troops report 
finding decompression helpful (Fertout et al., 2011), especially as a means of reducing alcohol 
misuse and general mental distress (Jones et al., 2014). However, this is only the case for 
individuals with low to moderate combat exposure, and there is little robust evidence that 
decompression or early intervention psychoeducational programmes (such as Battlemind 
UK) are an effective means of preventing the development of PTSD (Fertout et al., 2011; 
Mulligan et al., 2013). In general, further exploration of the transition period is needed, since 
research suggests that PTSD symptomatology increases between first returning home and 





In summary, in comparison with civilian groups, combat personnel are at greater risk of 
developing PTSD, their symptoms tend to be more severe and chronic, and they appear less 
likely to seek help. There are many possible reasons for these differences in presentation, 
including greater exposure to traumatic events, stigma, clinicians’ poor understanding of 
military culture and problems associated with reintegration into civilian life. Adjustment 
difficulties in particular are associated with worse outcomes for combat personnel with 
PTSD. It is unclear whether the packages of support that are routinely offered to combat 
personnel to aid reintegration are effective as preventative measures for PTSD, especially for 
those with the highest levels of combat exposure who are therefore most at risk. 
 
In order to understand more about combat-related PTSD, it is important to consider the 
mechanisms involved in the development and maintenance of PTSD in general, and how 
these might differentially affect combat personnel. 
 
1.4 A COGNITIVE MODEL OF PTSD 
For PTSD in general, the cognitive model developed by Ehlers and Clark (2000) is a useful 
way to conceptualise symptoms and understand the development and maintenance of the 
disorder. It suggests that prominent PTSD symptoms such as intrusions and hyperarousal, 
which give rise to a current sense of threat, are influenced by a) the nature of trauma memory, 
and b) negative appraisals of the trauma and/or its sequelae (see figure 1.1 for further detail).  
 






With respect to the nature of trauma memory, there is substantial evidence to suggest that 
memories of traumatic events can often be fragmented and consist of primarily multisensory 
impressions rather than coherent thoughts, differing from other autobiographical memories 
(e.g. Brewin, 2011). This means that traumatic memories lack contextual information that 
denotes a specific time and place, and sensory features of the present environment that are 
shared with the past traumatic event can lead to intrusive symptoms (Ehlers & Clark, 2000). 
Whilst this is an important feature of PTSD, it is unlikely that the nature of traumatic 
memories differs between PTSD in general vs. combat populations. By contrast, the two 
populations may be differentiated by the second maintaining mechanism described above: 
negative appraisals about the trauma or associated consequences. The systematic tendency 
to process information in a way that consistently leads to negative appraisals is referred to as 
cognitive bias. The ways in which cognitive biases may have specific relevance for the 
maintenance of PTSD in combat personnel will be discussed in greater detail below.  
 
1.5 THE ROLE OF COGNITIVE BIASES IN COMBAT-RELATED PTSD  
1.5.1 How do cognitive biases maintain PTSD symptoms? 
For people with PTSD (stemming from any traumatic event), cognitive models purport that 
emotional distress arises from biased appraisals relating to impending threat (Ehlers & Clark, 
2000). These misappraisals take the form of negative cognitions, such as “the world is 
unsafe”, “no one is trustworthy” and “I am weak” and are said to be the products of cognitive 
biases (Nanney et al., 2015). For instance, a cognitive bias whereby people tend to 
overgeneralise learning from a traumatic event leads them to perceive everyday activities as 
dangerous and negative outcomes as more likely. This bias might lead to negative cognitions 
such as “If I am not on guard, I will be attacked”.  
 
Misappraisals arising from cognitive biases can in turn lead to dysfunctional behavioural 
strategies, such as avoidance or social withdrawal, in addition to cognitive strategies such as 
thought suppression or rumination (Ehlers & Clark, 2000). These strategies might help in 
the short-term by providing temporary relief and a sense of safety. However, in the long-
term, they perpetuate symptoms by preventing people from learning that their expectations 
may be inaccurate, and that discontinuing their strategies will not automatically produce the 
feared outcome. Another way in which cognitive biases maintain PTSD symptoms pertains 
to people’s limited information processing capacity; ability to process information, and the 
preferential processing of negative or threat-related information reduces opportunities for 




In what way might cognitive biases be distinct for combat soldiers versus the general 
population? Firstly, cognitive biases are thought to develop on the basis of individual 
predisposition and experience. Greifeneder et al. (2017) argue that people construct a 
personal, “subjective social reality”, and that it is this social reality rather than objective input 
that dictates their interpretation of events and behavioural responses. Combat soldiers are 
likely to have relatively unique personal experiences in comparison with the general 
population, with higher exposure to traumatic events and more prolonged periods of danger. 
Their biases in information processing are therefore likely to be influenced by a different 
subjective social reality. Secondly, as described above, people in the general population with 
PTSD are likely to adopt dysfunctional behavioural strategies to manage their distress and 
make themselves feel safer. Combat soldiers, who experience more severe and enduring 
PTSD symptoms (e.g. Brinker et al., 2007), are more likely to remain vigilant to threat than 
their civilian counterparts (Henigsberg et al., 2001). There are also higher rates of substance 
misuse in combat soldiers with PTSD relative to those without PTSD (Bremner et al., 1996); 
comorbid substance misuse is also more prevalent in combat soldiers with PTSD than in 
individuals with PTSD stemming from alternative sources of trauma (Deering et al., 1996). 
 
Taken together, there are a number of hypothetical ways in which the link between cognitive 
biases and ongoing PTSD symptoms is stronger for combat personnel than the general 
public, but limited research has contrasted these groups directly. Nonetheless, substantial 
research has examined specific cognitive biases that contribute to the maintenance of PTSD 
symptoms; these will be reviewed below.  
 
1.5.2 Specific cognitive biases implicated in PTSD in the general population  
The research literature emphasises the association between three types of cognitive bias and 
PTSD in general (e.g. Constans, 2005; Bomyea et al., 2017): memory bias, attentional bias 
and judgment bias. 
 
Memory bias refers to systematic impairments or fallacies in the encoding or retrieval of 
memories, such that recollection of previous experiences is distorted by current knowledge, 
belief or emotion (Schacter, 1999). For instance, people may exaggerate the consistency 
between their current and previous beliefs about social issues, when in reality these may have 
changed over time (Markus 1986). There is some evidence to suggest that people with versus 




innocuous information (e.g. Amir et al., 1996; Golier et al., 2003; see Bomyea et al., 2017, for 
a recent review).  
 
Attentional bias refers to the tendency to allocate attention towards stimuli that are perceived 
as threatening. Although redirecting attention towards danger or strong threat is evidently an 
adaptive strategy (Mogg & Bradley, 1998), people with high levels of anxiety are sensitive to 
even mildly threatening stimuli. Continuous attentional bias towards mild threat may lead to 
increased stress and chronic hyperarousal, thus contributing directly to the development and 
maintenance of PTSD (Mathews & MacLeod, 2002). There is substantial evidence to suggest 
that in comparison with healthy controls, people with PTSD demonstrate attentional bias; 
they are more sensitive to and easily distracted by mildly threatening stimuli (e.g. Constans, 
2005; Bomyea et al., 2017) 
 
With respect to judgment bias, two specific types have been implicated in PTSD: subjective 
risk bias and interpretation bias (Constans, 2005). Subjective risk bias describes the increased 
perception of threat in the environment and the tendency to overestimate the likelihood of 
negative events taking place in future. For instance, symptoms of acute stress and PTSD are 
associated with a propensity to judge future negative events as more probable and more 
negatively impactful (Thrasher & Dalgleish, 1999; Warda & Bryant, 1998). In contrast with 
subjective estimates of risk, which are future-focused, interpretation bias (which is also 
subjective) describes the way in which people make judgements about current, ambiguous 
information. There is a body of literature highlighting the role of interpretation bias in PTSD. 
For example, one study found that combat veterans with PTSD were more likely to complete 
ambiguous sentences with threat-related words than those without PTSD (Kimble et al., 
2002). Another study found that people who had been victims of interpersonal trauma 
judged threatening endings of ambiguous social situations as more predictable and more 
likely to escalate in risk than did non-victims (Elwood et al., 2007). Furthermore, Kimble et 
al. (2012) presented trauma survivors with incomplete, ambiguous sentence stems (e.g. ‘the 
unfortunate man lost his…’). These sentence stems were completed with either expected 
(e.g. ‘lost his…wallet’), unexpected (e.g. ‘lost his…artist’), or threatening (e.g. ‘lost his…leg’) 
word endings. Trauma survivors with vs. without PTSD were more likely to judge 
threatening sentence endings as logical and had faster neural responses (as indicated by 
smaller event-related potentials or ERPs as measured by electroencephalography). This led 
the authors to conclude that those with vs. without PTSD had enhanced expectancy of threat 




relevance for PTSD, interpretation bias has been understudied in comparison with memory 
and attention biases (Bomyea et al., 2017). Interpretation bias may be particularly implicated 
in combat-related PTSD; this will be discussed further below.  
 
1.5.3 Interpretation bias and combat-related PTSD 
As described above, cognitive biases are generally thought to be adaptive ways to make rapid, 
efficient decisions. With respect to biases implicated in PTSD, combat environments are by 
definition risky, and thus the ability to recall threat-related information readily, to attend 
rapidly to threat and to assess risks when deciding on behaviour are effective strategies in 
that particular context (Castro et al., 2015). With respect to interpretation bias specifically, 
people with PTSD in the general population are often described as having an “exaggerated 
subjective sense of risk” (Bomyea et al., 2017). By contrast, combat veterans may have spent 
extended periods of time in an environment that is objectively ‘risky’. Interpreting ambiguous 
information as dangerous may be a helpful way to remain safe whilst combat soldiers are 
deployed. However, this strategy may no longer be appropriate once they have returned 
home, and the tendency to “assume the worst” may lead combat personnel to persist with 
warzone levels of threat-vigilance, which has been found to predict post-combat PTSD 
symptoms (Wald et al., 2013) and has also been linked to chronic sleep difficulties after 
returning to civilian life (Babson et al., 2012). These in turn are linked to poorer outcomes 
for individuals with PTSD.  
 
It is therefore possible that attenuated interpretation bias upon return to civilian life is 
associated with easier reintegration, whereas its persistence is associated with greater PTSD 
symptomatology. Alternatively, it is possible that interpretation bias is a feature of combat 
exposure rather than PTSD. However, no studies to date have contrasted cognitive appraisals 
of ambiguous situations in combat personnel with vs. without PTSD, nor have studies of 
interpretation bias in combat veterans included a civilian group to elucidate the relative 
contributions of combat exposure versus PTSD symptomatology.  
  
1.6 MEASURING INTERPRETATION BIAS 
The majority of studies investigating interpretation bias have involved experimental 
paradigms such as lexical decision-making tasks that may lack ecological validity. Moreover, 
many studies have used combat-related stimuli, which prohibits examination of 
interpretation bias in relation to commonplace, ambiguous situations people are more likely 




combat veterans with and without PTSD interpret everyday, non-combat situations that 
could be construed as threatening.  
 
An established measure of interpretation bias was used: the Bodily Sensations Interpretations 
Questionnaire (BSIQ; Clark et al., 1997). The BSIQ is a self-report measure of interpretation 
bias that consists of ambiguous scenarios that could be construed as threatening. The 
scenarios can be divided into four subscales: hyperarousal/panic symptoms and general 
health symptoms (both forms of internal threat), social events and general events (both forms 
of external threat). The BSIQ was initially developed to investigate the misinterpretation of 
bodily sensations in panic disorder but has since been used to assess interpretation bias in 
social phobia (e.g. Amina et al., 1998) and trait anxiety (Richards et al., 2001; Teachman, 
2005). Another study administered the BSIQ to a sample of women who had survived 
intimate partner violence and found that negative interpretation bias and poor coping skills 
were linked with greater PTSD symptom severity (Lambert et al., 2013). It was therefore 
deemed to be an appropriate choice of measure of interpretation bias in the current study. 
 
1.7 THE CURRENT STUDY 
Despite the fact that the concept of PTSD stems from combat-related experiences and that 
PTSD is more common, severe and persistent in combat veterans, there is a paucity of work 
examining cognitive biases in this group. In particular, given the advantages of remaining 
threat-vigilant in the context of combat, the extent to which interpretation bias can be 
considered pathological in a combat veteran sample is unclear. Interpretation bias might be 
a feature of combat exposure rather than PTSD. Alternatively, its persistence in civilian life, 
once the objective level of threat is substantially lower, could differentiate between PTSD 
and non-PTSD veterans.  
 
The current study aimed to address this question by using the BSIQ to compare 
interpretation bias in combat veterans with PTSD, combat veterans without PTSD, and 
civilian controls. Although the relationship between military PTSD and interpretation bias 
was the primary focus of the current research, PTSD symptom severity has been linked with 
catastrophising about the future (e.g. Carty et al., 2011) and poor coping skills (Olff et al., 
2005; Lambert et al., 2013). It was therefore felt that these factors might differentiate the 






1.8 HYPOTHESES  
It was expected that in relation to performance on the BSIQ: 
1. Veterans with PTSD would generate more negative interpretations of ambiguous 
scenarios than veterans without PTSD and civilian controls.  
2. When presented with different possible interpretations, those with PTSD would 
judge negative interpretations as more likely than either control group.  
3. When asked to imagine that the negative interpretation was true, it was expected that 
participants with PTSD would judge the future to be more catastrophic and to rate 
themselves as less able to cope in comparison with either control group.  
4. The two control groups (combat veterans without PTSD and civilians without 
PTSD) would not differ on any aspect of the BSIQ.  
5. With respect to the four different types of scenarios within the BSIQ, any group 
differences might be exacerbated in relation to scenarios that describe general events 
in the world and scenarios describing social interactions with other people (external 
threat) rather than scenarios describing panic-related symptoms or those describing 







2.1 ETHICAL APPROVAL 
Ethical approval was obtained from the King’s College London Research Ethics Committee 
(see Appendix 1 for approval letter).  
 
2.2 DESIGN 
There was one between-participants factor of group membership (veterans with PTSD vs. 
veterans without PTSD vs. controls). There was one within-participants factor of scenario 
type (hyperarousal symptoms vs. other health symptoms vs. social events vs. general events). 
 
2.3 PARTICIPANTS 
Three groups of participants were recruited: combat veterans with PTSD, combat veterans 
without PTSD and members of the general population who had no military experience and 
had never experienced difficulties related to PTSD. Veterans with PTSD were recruited from 
Combat Stress, a UK-based charity that offers support to veterans with mental health 
difficulties, via either letters or open online advertisement. Veterans without PTSD were 
recruited via the Kings Centre for Military Health Research (KCMHR) from a cohort of 
military personnel who deployed to the 2003 Iraq War (see Hotopf et al., 2006 for details of 
cohort). Those in the cohort who had consented to being contacted to take part in further 
research, had not previously met criteria for PTSD and identified as primarily occupying a 
combat role were contacted by email. Civilian participants were opportunistically recruited 
via online adverts. Given that the majority of combat veterans are male, the current study 
only recruited male participants. Thus, the final sample comprised 20 veterans with PTSD 
(mean age 43.90; SD 9.03), 22 veterans without PTSD (mean age 43.05; SD 8.61) and 20 
civilian participants (mean age 42.45; SD 11.21). Sample sizes were determined in accordance 
with the guidelines set out by Cohen (1992), indicating that a sample size of 20 participants 
per group is necessary to detect a large effect size, with power set at 80% and alpha at 10%. 
These sample sizes were also comparable with other research work involving veterans with 
and without PTSD and civilian controls (e.g. Armstrong et al., 2013).  
 
2.4 PROCEDURE 
In view of the veteran participants’ combat exposure, and the possible risk of emotional 
distress associated with these experiences, it was agreed that a researcher would remain on 




as detailed above, veteran participants were contacted by letter, email, or online advert with 
an invitation to participate in the current study. A comprehensive information sheet and 
consent form were attached to the invitation. Participants responded to the invitation by 
contacting the researcher directly. After agreeing a date and time to take part and providing 
contact details, participants were called directly and were simultaneously sent a study weblink. 
Civilian participants were recruited via an online advert that described the overall aims of the 
study and provided both a study email address for any queries and the study weblink. The 
study website contained an information sheet reiterating the broad aims of the study and 
explaining participants’ right to withdraw, alongside an online consent form (see Appendices 
2-7 for all cover letters, information sheets and consent forms). After providing online 
consent, participants were directed to online versions of the Bodily Symptoms 
Interpretations Questionnaire (BSIQ), the PTSD checklist (PCL), and the COPE Inventory. 
For the BSIQ, each question was presented on a separate page, with participants clicking a 
button to be taken forward to the next page. All questions for the PCL and COPE were 
presented on a page each. A researcher remained on the telephone to veteran participants 
while they completed the online survey to provide emotional support; no additional support 
with task completion was provided. All participants were paid for their participation.  
 
2.5 MATERIALS 
2.5.1 Bodily Sensations Interpretations Questionnaire (BSIQ) 
2.5.1.1 BSIQ task description  
The BSIQ (Clark et al., 1997) is a measure comprising 27 brief scenarios describing 
ambiguous situations that could be interpreted as threatening (see Figure 2.1). These 
scenarios are categorised into four main subtypes: hyperarousal or panic sensations (n=7), 
other general health symptoms (n=6), social events (n=8) and general events (n=6). 
Hyperarousal and health symptom items describe an internal sense of threat, whereas social 
and general event items pertain to external threat (see Figure 2.1 for example scenarios). 
Although initially developed to investigate the misinterpretation of bodily sensations in panic 
disorder, it has since been found to be a sensitive measure for those with social phobia, trait 





Figure 2.1: Sample scenarios from the BSIQ 
 
 
Hyperarousal scenario: “You notice your heart is beating quickly” 
1. Why?  
2. Please arrange the following explanations in order of likelihood: 
a. Because you have been physically active. 
b. Because there is something wrong with your heart. 
c. Because you are feeling tired.  
General health scenario: “You have been eating normally but have recently lost some weight” 
1. Why?  
2. Please arrange the following explanations in order of likelihood: 
a. You have cancer. 
b. It’s a normal fluctuation. 
c. You have been rushing around more than usual.  
Social event scenario: “An old acquaintance passes you in the street without acknowledging you” 
1. Why?  
2. Please arrange the following explanations in order of likelihood: 
a. They recognised you but think you’re not worth talking to. 
b. Your appearance has changed since they last saw you and so they did not recognise you. 
c. They had other things on their mind.  
General event: “A crisis comes up at work and you can’t immediately think of what to do” 
1. Why?  
2. Please arrange the following explanations in order of likelihood: 
a. It’s an unusual situation which you haven’t encountered before. 
b. You need a moment to think about a solution. 
c. You are inadequate to deal with the problem.  
Follow-up questions (for all items): 
Hyperarousal scenario: “You notice your heart is beating quickly”. How likely are each of the following 
explanations: 
a. How likely is this because you have been physically active?  
b. How likely is this because there is something wrong with your heart? 
c. How likely is this because you are feeling tired? 
 
0__________________2___________________4___________________6___________________8 
Not at all      A little       Moderately               Very     Extremely 
likely                    likely 
 
Imagine that your heart is beating quickly and pounding because there is something wrong with your heart.  
 
What would the future be like if this were true? 
a) There would be little to no long-term change for me 
b) There would be some negative consequences, but I would be able to overcome these  
c) There would be several negative consequences that would be difficult to overcome 
d) It would be impossible to overcome the consequences of this happening  
 
How would you rate your ability to cope? 
 
0__________________________________________________________________________________10 
Completely unable                       Completely able 







2.5.1.1.1 Verbal interpretations 
Participants were initially required to generate an explanation about what is happening in 
each scenario and were then asked to rank three possible explanations, one of which was 
negative, in order of likelihood.  
 
2.5.1.1.2 Ranking and ratings of likelihood of negative outcomes 
After participants did this for all 27 items, they reviewed the scenarios again and this time 
provided likelihood ratings for each set of three explanations on a scale of 0-8 (0=not at all 
likely, 8= extremely likely).  
 
2.5.1.1.3 Imagining the future and coping 
In an extension of the original task, participants in the current study were also asked to make 
two further judgments. Firstly, they were asked to judge what the future would be like if the 
worst-case scenario were true. They chose between four possible options: little to no change, 
some negative consequences that would be possible to overcome, several negative 
consequences that would be difficult to overcome, and consequences that would be 
impossible to overcome. Secondly, they were asked how able they would feel to cope with 
the situation, on a scale of 0-10. 
 
2.5.1.2 BSIQ scoring  
2.5.1.2.1 Scoring of verbal interpretations 
Participants’ verbal responses were firstly classified with respect to whether they made 
explicit reference to their own anxiety symptoms, gave some other negative interpretation, 
provided a neutral explanation or gave a response that could not be classified (e.g. “I don’t 
know”; see Figure 2.2 for example responses). All responses were given a score of 0 if they 
were neutral or unclassifiable, and a score of 1 if anxiety-related or any other negative 
interpretation; these scores were summed across all items to give a total negative 
interpretation score. Separate total scores were created for each of the four types of scenario 
items (hyperarousal, general health, social event and general event). Percentages were then 
created in order to account for the different number of items per scenario subtype.   
 
2.5.1.2.2 Scoring ranking and ratings of likelihood of negative outcomes 
Participants were awarded a score of 3, 2 or 1 for each item depending on how they ranked 
them. For instance, if the most negative interpretation was ranked first, a score of 3 was 




awarded. The remaining two interpretations were not scored. Scores denoting participants’ 
rankings of the negative interpretations were then summed across each items, with higher 
scores denoting greater endorsement of the negative interpretation. Participants’ ratings 
pertaining to the likelihood of each negative interpretation were also summed across items; 
the likelihood ratings for the remaining two interpretations were not included in the scoring. 
As above, percentages were calculated for each scenario subtype for both ranking and rating 
data.  
 
2.5.1.2.3 Imagining the future  
Participants were asked to imagine what the future would be like if the negative interpretation 
were true and were awarded a score of 3, 2, 1 or 0 depending on the extent to which they 
felt there would be negative consequences that would be difficult to overcome. For instance, 
if participants felt there would be little to no change, they were given a score of 0 and if they 
felt the consequences would be impossible to overcome, they were given a score of 3. These 
scores were summed across scenarios, with higher scores pertaining to more catastrophic 
beliefs about the future, and percentages calculated for each scenario subtype.  
 
2.5.1.2.4 Coping  
Participants were also asked to rate their ability to cope if the negative interpretation were 
true; these ratings were also summed across items, with higher scores denoting greater coping 





Figure 2.2: Example participant responses to the BSIQ from the current study  
 
 
Negative responses  
Anxiety-related interpretation:  
“Start of an anxiety attack” (hyperarousal scenario)  
“Stressing too much about everything (general health scenario) 
“They know I have PTSD and are uncomfortable” (social event scenario) 
“I’m panicking” (general event scenario)  
Other negative interpretation: 
“Being in an alien and uncomfortable environment (hyperarousal scenario)  
“Cancer” (general health scenario) 
“They are rude” (social event scenario)  
“I’m in trouble” (general event scenario) 
Neutral responses  
Non-negative interpretation: 
“I’ve been exercising” (hyperarousal scenario) 
“Exercising more” (general health scenario)  
“They did not see me because they were distracted” (social event scenario)  
“I don’t have all the information I need” (general event scenario) 
 Unclassifiable  
“I don’t know” (any scenario)  
“This is weird” (any scenario) 
 
 
2.5.2 PTSD Checklist (PCL) 
The PCL (Weathers & Ford, 1996) is a self-report questionnaire comprising 17 items that 
describe problems that arise following stressful life events and correspond with PTSD 
symptoms described in DSM-IV. Respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which 
they have been bothered by these over the past month. The items correspond to key 
symptoms of PTSD such as re-experiencing (e.g. “repeated disturbing memories, thoughts 
or images of a stressful experience from the past”), hypervigilance (e.g. “being super alert, 
watchful or on guard”) and avoidance (e.g. “avoiding memories, thoughts, or feelings related 
to the stressful experience”). Each item is on a 5-point, Likert-type scale with ‘not at all’, ‘a 
little bit’, ‘moderately’, ‘quite a bit’ and ‘extremely’ as possible responses. PCL scores range 
from 17-85 and the measure has been shown to have strong convergent validity, since it 




demonstrates good internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha .97) and strong test-retest 
reliability (r=.96).   
 
2.5.3 COPE Inventory 
The COPE inventory is a self-report questionnaire that assesses different strategies people 
adopt when responding to stressful life events. The questionnaire consists of 60 items, that 
fall into 15 distinct coping strategies. Participants were asked to rate the extent to which they 
adopt each strategy on a 4-point, Likert-type scale with ‘I usually don’t do this at all’, ‘I usually 
do this a little bit’, ‘I usually do this a medium amount’ and ‘I usually do this a lot’ as possible 
responses. Litman (2006) conducted factor analysis on the COPE inventory and proposed 
four factors, corresponding to broad coping styles: self-sufficient (problem-focus), self-
sufficient (emotion focus), socially supported and avoidant coping. Item examples are 
included in Figure 2.3. Items falling within each of the four factors were summed to derive 
four factor scores, with higher scores denoting greater endorsement of the coping style. The 
measure has good internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha .79) and demonstrates both 
convergent and discriminant validity (Carver et al., 1989).  
 
2.6 STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
Analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to compare the three groups on each of the 
measures. A significance level of .05 was adopted in the current study; an adjusted 
significance value of .01 was applied to any post-hoc t-tests. Parametric tests were used since 
these have greater power to reject a false null hypothesis than non-parametric equivalents 






Figure 2.3: sample items from the COPE Inventory:  
 
Factor 1: Self-sufficient (problem-focus): 
 
Strategy 1: Active coping                 “I concentrate my efforts on doing something about it” 
 
Strategy 2: Suppression of competing activities          I keep myself from getting distracted by other thoughts or activities” 
 
Strategy 3: Planning              “I make a plan of action” 
 
 
Factor 2: Self-sufficient (emotion-focus): 
 
Strategy 4: Positive reinterpretation and growth            “I try to grow as a person as a result of the experience” 
 
Strategy 5: Religious coping:                “I put my trust in God” 
 
Strategy 6: Humour:              “I laugh at the situation”  
 
Strategy 7: Restraint:                   “I make sure not to make matters worse by acting too quickly” 
 
Strategy 8: Acceptance:       “I accept that this has happened and that it can’t be changed”  
 
 
Factor 3: Socially supported 
 
Strategy 9: Focus on and venting of emotions:         “I get upset and let my emotions out”  
 
Strategy 10: Use of instrumental social support:    “I try to get advice from someone about what to do” 
 
Strategy 11: Use of emotional social support:      “I get sympathy and understanding from someone” 
 
 
Factor 4: Avoidant coping 
 
Strategy 12: Mental disengagement:           “I go to the movies or watch TV to think about this less” 
 
Strategy 13: Denial:                     “I refuse to believe that it has happened” 
 
Strategy 14: Behavioural disengagement:        “I admit to myself that I can’t deal with it and quit trying”  
 











Table 3.1 Means and standard deviations for all variables  
    PTSD+ Veterans PTSD- Veterans Civilians  
    Mean (SD)  Mean (SD)  Mean (SD) 
    (N=20)  (N=22)  (N= 20) 
BSIQ  
Negative interpretation rankings (%) 
Hyperarousal symptoms 50.71 (14.10)  40.91 (10.96)  40.71.7.16 
General health symptoms 50.00 (14.64)  42.17 (11.59)  38.89 (6.74) 
Social events   73.96 (20.98)  45.83 (12.73)  43.75 (10.69) 
General events   60.56 (17.09)   40.66 (8.64)  39.72 (9.58) 
Negative interpretation likelihood ratings (%)  
Hyperarousal symptoms 34.38 (21.03)   19.16 (10.25)  17.32 (7.73) 
General health symptoms 32.71 (21.80)  30.11 (12.98)   19.90 (8.04) 
Social events   49.69 (24.82)  27.06 (16.11)  26.09 (11.54) 
General events   40.73 (19.29)  23.01 (10.88)  23.54 (12.19) 
Verbally generated negative interpretations (%) 
Hyperarousal symptoms 52.14 (21.88)  13.64 (16.18)  21.43 (11.82) 
General health symptoms 19.17 (20.43)  8.33 (11.21)  5.00 (12.21) 
Social events   45.63 (30.15)  17.04 (20.97)  17.50 (17.86) 
General events   39.17 (23.11)  11.36 (13.98)  6.67 (11.34) 
Catastrophising (%)  
Hyperarousal symptoms 51.19 (20.37)  44.81 (10.15)  51.43 (14.87) 
General health symptoms 53.06 (21.13)  45.71 (10.42)  49.72 (14.47) 
Social events   37.92 (19.68)  12.88 (10.28)  15.83 (10.00)  
General events   51.39 (15.91)  40.91 (9.00)  39.72 (13.28) 
Coping ability (%)    
Hyperarousal symptoms 44.57 (17.25)  76.23 (13.32)  61.86 (13.59)  
General health symptoms 42.42 (19.06)  86.68 (32.91)  61.67 (14.31) 
Social events   57.88 (21.94)  94.38 (8.21)  81.19 (8.91) 




    PTSD+ Veterans PTSD- Veterans Civilians  
    Mean (SD)  Mean (SD)  Mean (SD) 
    (N=20)  (N=22)  (N= 20) 
PCL  
Total PCL Score  71.65 (4.81)  23.86 (74.43)  29.90 (10.74)
  
COPE INVENTORY 
Self-sufficient    33.61 (18.69)  53.16 (26.68)  55.28 (19.05) 
problem-focused (%) 
 
Self-sufficient    25.08 (11.35)  38.33 (13.63)  43.50 (14.33) 
emotion-focused (%) 
 
Socially supported (%)  31.67 (18.69)  31.44 (22.59)  39.86 (18.54) 
Avoidant (%)   37.19 (17.06)  8.71 (5.70)  19.79 (12.94) 
 
 
3.1 DATA CHECKS 
In order to ensure that the assumptions of normality underlying parametric tests were met 
by the present data, tests for skewness and outliers were carried out. Skewness was 
determined by the Shapiro-Wilk test, and data points were judged to be outliers if they did 
not fall within three standard deviations of the mean. All but three variables were normally 
distributed (negative rankings, negative verbal responses and coping ability). One method of 
adjusting data to reduce skewness is to perform a transformation. Appropriate 
transformations were decided up on using Tukey’s ‘ladder of transformations’ (Erickson & 
Nosenchuk, 1992). However, the non-normally distributed variables in the current study 
could not be transformed to normality using this method. Non-parametric tests 
(independent-samples Kruskal-Wallis) were therefore performed, and these revealed a similar 
pattern of results to the parametric tests; parametric analyses have therefore been reported 
throughout. Four data points were found to fall outside of three standard deviations of the 
mean. However, excluding these participants did not change the pattern of results (and doing 
so is generally considered to be poor practice) and therefore all data have been included in 







3.2.1 Generated verbal responses  
Veterans with PTSD (PTSD+), veterans without PTSD (PTSD-) and civilian controls were 
compared with respect to the number of negative interpretations they generated when 
providing explanations for ambiguous events (see Figure 3.1). A 3x4 ANOVA was 
conducted with one between-groups factor (PTSD+ veterans/PTSD- veterans/civilians) 
and one within-groups factor (scenario type: hyperarousal symptom/other health 
symptom/social event/general event). There was a main effect of group (F(2, 59)=25.211; 
p<.001). Pairwise comparisons indicated that veterans with PTSD were significantly more 
likely to generate negative interpretations than both PTSD- veterans (p<.001) and civilian 
participants (p<.001) and that the two control groups did not differ significantly (p>.05). 
There was also a main effect of scenario type (F(3, 57)= 28.125; p<.001); pairwise 
comparisons revealed that regardless of group membership, scenarios describing health 
symptoms were interpreted significantly less negatively than all other scenario types (p values 
ranging from .008 to <.001) and hyperarousal scenarios were interpreted significantly more 
negatively than general events (p<.001). Lastly, there was a significant interaction between 
group and scenario type (F(3, 58)=8.85; p<.001). Post-hoc t-tests were conducted to 
elucidate the nature of this interaction (and an adjusted significance value of .01 was 
adopted). These tests revealed that although the veterans with PTSD generated more 
negative interpretation than both control groups across all scenario types, these differences 
were strongest for hyperarousal, social events and general events (p<.001) and weakest for 
other health symptoms (p=.011).  
 







3.2.2 Endorsement of negative interpretations 
3.2.2.1 Ranking likelihood of negative outcomes  
Participants were compared with respect to how they ranked the likelihood of negative 
interpretations in the BSIQ (see Figure 3.2). There was a significant main effect of group 
(F(2, 59)=18.53; p<.001). Pairwise comparisons revealed that the PTSD+ veterans ranked 
negative interpretations as significantly more likely than both PTSD- veterans and civilian 
participants (p<.001) and that the two control groups did not differ significantly in their 
rankings (>.05). There was also a main effect of scenario type (F(3, 57)=16.749; p<.001): 
pairwise comparisons found that negative interpretations in social event scenarios were as 
ranked as significantly more likely than all other scenario types (p<.001). Lastly, there was a 
significant interaction between group and scenario type F(3, 58)=13.548; p<.001). Post-hoc 
t-tests (adopting a stricter significance level) revealed that group differences were exacerbated 
in social event (p<.001) and general event scenarios (p<.001) compared to the other scenario 
types (p>.05). 
 




3.2.2.2 Rating likelihood of negative outcomes 
The groups were also compared with respect to how likely they judged each negative 
interpretation to be (see Figure 3.3). There was once again a main effect of group (F(2, 
59)=9.567; p<.001); pairwise comparisons indicated that the PTSD+ veterans rated negative 
interpretations as more likely than both PTSD- veterans (p=.003) and civilian participants 
(p<.001) and the two control groups did not differ significantly (p>.05). There was also a 
main effect of scenario type (F(3, 57)= 12.649; p<.001); regardless of group membership, all 




any other scenario type (p values ranging from .003 to <.001). Negative interpretations in 
social scenarios were also rated as more likely than those in scenarios describing other health-
related symptoms (p=.003). Negative interpretations in social scenarios were also rated as 
more likely than in scenarios describing general events, but this only approached significance 
(p=.017) when adopting a stricter significance level of .01. Finally, there was a significant 
interaction between group and scenario type (F(3, 58)=11.714; p<.001). Post-hoc t-tests 
revealed that PTSD+ veterans rated negative interpretations as more likely than either 
control group for hyperarousal (p.001-.003), social event (p≤.001) and general event scenarios 
(p=.001), but not for other health symptoms (p>.05).  
 




3.2.3 Imagining the future  
The groups were compared with respect to their ratings pertaining to the future 
consequences if the negative interpretations of scenarios were true, with higher scores 
denoting more catastrophic beliefs (see Figure 3.4). There was a main effect of group (F(2, 
59)=5.807; p=.005); pairwise comparisons demonstrated that PTSD+ veterans rated the 
future as more catastrophic than PTSD- veterans (p.005). However, post-hoc tests did not 
show significant differences between either veteran group and the civilian control group 
(p>.05). There was a main effect of scenario type (F(3, 57)= 28.125; p<.001), such that 
participants rated negative interpretations of ambiguous social events as significantly less 
catastrophic than all other scenario types (p<.001). There was also a significant interaction 
between group and scenario type (F(3, 58)=8.946; p<.001), with post-hoc t-tests revealing 




general event (p=.01) and social event (p<.001) scenarios. However, no group differences 
emerged for scenarios describing hyperarousal or other general health symptoms (p>.05).  
 




3.2.4 Coping ability  
In the final aspect of the BSIQ, participants were asked to imagine that negative 
interpretations of scenarios were true and to rate their ability to cope (see Figure 3.5). There 
was once again a main effect of group (F(2, 59)=32.474; p<.001), with pairwise comparisons 
revealing that PTSD+ veterans rated themselves as significantly less able to cope than either 
control group (p<.001). In addition, the PTSD- group reported their ability to cope as 
significantly higher than the civilian control group (p=.006). There was also a main effect of 
scenario type (F(3, 57)= 58.378; p<.001). Pairwise comparisons found that all participants 
felt significantly less able to cope in the worst -case scenario interpretation of hyperarousal 
symptoms compared to social (p<.001) or general events (p=.003), and social events elicited 
significantly higher coping scores than any other scenario type (p<.001).  
 
Finally, there was a group by scenario type interaction (F(3, 58)=6.019; p=.001); post-hoc t-
test were conducted to disentangle this interaction. In the worst-case scenario interpretations 
of all four scenario types, PTSD+ veterans reported feeling significantly less able to cope 
than PTSD- veterans (p<.001). PTSD+ veterans also rated their coping ability as significantly 
lower than the civilian controls for hyperarousal (p=.001), general event (p=.002), and social 
event items (p <.001); this trend only approached significance for other health symptom 
items after correcting for post-hoc t-tests (p=.04). Lastly, with respect to the two control 




scenario of hyperarousal, general event and other health symptom items (p values ranging 
from .006 to .011); there were no significant group differences for social event items (p>.05)   
 





Participants completed a self-report questionnaire measure of relating to PTSD symptoms 
(the PTSD Checklist; PCL). A total score was generated for each participant, and an ANOVA 
was conducted to compare the three groups. Unsurprisingly, the PTSD+ veterans had 
significantly higher scores on the PCL than both the PTSD- veterans (p<.001) and the civilian 
controls (p<.001). The two control groups did not significantly differ in their PCL scores 
(p>.05). 
 
3.4 COPE INVENTORY 
Participants completed a self-report questionnaire measure relating to coping strategies. 
There were four broad categories of coping: self-sufficient coping strategies that focused on 
problem-solving, self-sufficient coping strategies that focused on emotional wellbeing, 
strategies that involved eliciting social support, and avoidant coping strategies. Thus, a 3x4 
ANOVA was conducted (group [PTSD+ vs. PTSD- vs. civilian controls] by coping style 
[self-sufficient problem-focused vs. self-sufficient emotion-focused vs. socially supported vs. 
avoidant]).  
 
Results revealed no main effect of group (F(2, 59)=2.359; p=.103). However, there was a 
main effect of coping style (F(3, 57)=20.393; p<.001), whereby all participants reported being 




of coping strategy (p<.001) and significantly less likely to use avoidant coping strategies than 
any other type (p<.001). 
 
The most notable finding was that there was a significant interaction between group and 
coping style (F(3, 58)=31.504; p<.001). When comparing the groups’ self-reported use of 
self-sufficient problem-focused strategies, the PTSD+ group used these strategies to a lesser 
extent than the civilian controls (p=.008). The PTSD+ group also tended to use these 
strategies less than the PTSD- group, but after correcting for post-hoc tests, this difference 
did not meet significance (p=.017). The PTSD+ veterans used self-sufficient problem-
focused strategies to a significantly lesser extent than both PTSD- veterans (p=.006) and 
civilian controls (p<.001). There were no significant group differences with respect to the 
tendency to elicit social support as a means of coping (p>.05). Lastly, the PTSD+ veterans 
used avoidant coping strategies to a greater extent than both PTSD- veterans (p<.001) and 
civilian controls (p<.001). The two control groups did not differ in their self-reported use of 







4.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
This study compared combat veterans with PTSD, combat veterans without PTSD, and 
civilian participants using a measure of interpretation bias. As hypothesised, veterans with 
PTSD generated more negative explanations for ambiguous situations than the veteran or 
civilian control groups and also ranked and rated negative interpretations of ambiguous 
situations as more likely. Also consistent with the hypotheses, veterans with PTSD felt less 
able to cope with negative outcomes than both control groups. Veterans with PTSD had 
more catastrophic beliefs about the future than those without PTSD but did not show the 
predicted difference in comparison with civilian controls.  
 
Since interpretation bias was postulated to be a feature of PTSD rather than a consequence 
of combat exposure, it was hypothesised that the two control groups would not differ. The 
findings were broadly consistent with this, with no differences emerging for most variables. 
However, the control groups differed with respect to their beliefs about their ability to cope 
with the worst-case scenario. Veterans without PTSD rated themselves as more able to cope 
than did civilian controls, and this difference was exacerbated for hyperarousal and general 
event scenarios.   
 
Lastly, it was expected that any group differences would be exacerbated in situations 
involving possible ‘external threat’. The findings were broadly in support of this, with the 
strongest group differences found in relation to social events and general events and the 
weakest differences found in relation to general health symptoms. These findings will now 
be explored in greater depth  
 
4.2 INTERPRETATION OF FINDINGS 
4.2.1 Results in relation to interpretation bias  
The current study aimed to explore how interpretation bias might differentiate combat 
veterans with and without PTSD and found that veterans with PTSD tended to generate 
more negative interpretations and to judge these types of interpretations to be more likely 
than those without PTSD. The rationale for this study and these findings will now be 





Interpretation bias describes the systematic tendency to judge ambiguous information as 
negative or threatening (Constans, 2005). Previous research has found enhanced 
interpretation bias in people with versus without PTSD using a variety of methodologies 
including an ambiguous sentence completion task (Kimble et al., 2002) and videoclips with 
ambiguous endings (Elwood et al., 2007). In these studies, participants with PTSD tended to 
resolve ambiguity with negative or threat-related interpretations, and to judge these 
interpretations to be more plausible. However, it was unclear how an association between 
PTSD and interpretation bias might manifest in combat personnel. This lack of clarity is 
because military personnel in combat zones may adaptively remain vigilant and react rapidly 
to potential threats. Doing so in a warzone, which is an inherently threatening environment, 
may save a service person’s life. Moreover, previous research has found that threat vigilance 
in deployed soldiers without PTSD was comparable to non-deployed participants with PTSD 
(Kimble et al., 2013), thus implying that threat vigilance is a likely consequence of deployment 
and should not be pathologised in a military population. If the tendency to interpret 
information as threatening is due to combat exposure rather than simply to PTSD, it would 
be reasonable to expect that the veteran groups in the current study might not have differed 
on the BSIQ. In fact, the current findings indicated that veterans without PTSD not only 
differed from those with PTSD, they did not differ in negative interpretations relative to 
civilian controls. This suggests that interpretation bias was associated primarily with PTSD 
symptoms and somewhat independent of combat exposure. 
 
Why did the two combat veteran groups differ? One possible explanation is that this reflects 
pre-existing differences in that they were subject to different risk factors prior to their 
experiences at war (e.g. early trauma etc.) that have been identified as relevant risk factors for 
PTSD (e.g. Shalev, 1996). If this was the case, it is possible that administering the BSIQ even 
prior to combat might have elicited group differences. A future study could examine this by 
administering the BSIQ pre- and post-deployment. Another possible explanation is that 
despite similar experiences of combat, veterans without PTSD were less successful in their 
reintegration into civilian life. This explanation is consistent with existing literature which 
suggests that combat veterans with PTSD may be adversely affected by difficulties after 
returning home in addition to experiencing warzone-related difficulties (e.g. Iversen et al., 
2005). In particular, the literature suggests that combat veterans struggle in their relationships 
with others, report feelings of alienation and a sense of “us and them” (e.g. Hall, 2013). This 
might influence their perception that other people are threatening, which could in part 




differences tended to be exacerbated in ambiguous situations indicating threats from the 
external environment or from other people. For instance, in the scenario in which an 
acquaintance ignores the participant, feeling distant or alienated from others may be more 
likely to lead to the interpretation that the acquaintance is rude or angry, or offended.   
 
A number of studies have examined cognitive biases in military populations using tasks that 
involve combat-related stimuli. The findings from these studies provide further evidence for 
the notion that the veterans with PTSD in the current study may have continued to be 
affected by their combat experiences to a greater extent than those without PTSD. For 
example, Kimble et al. (2002) found that veterans with PTSD were more likely to complete 
ambiguous sentences with military versus non-military words, and various studies have found 
that combat veterans with PTSD demonstrate greater attentional interference, specifically 
for combat-related words (Ashley et al., 2013; Olatunji et al., 2013). This body of research 
has focused on early stages of processing, using tasks involving single-world stimuli that yield 
reaction time data such as modified Stroop or dot-probe. These tasks, whilst theoretically 
very useful, are abstract and have limited generalisability. This suggests that further research 
may be needed in order to compare combat-related versus everyday stimuli in more 
ecologically valid, scenario-based tasks. 
 
Taken together, it is possible that an attenuated threat response during reintegration into 
civilian life is associated with fewer adjustment difficulties, whereas the persistence of a threat 
response which is adaptive on deployment is associated with greater PTSD symptomatology. 
These potential integration challenges may have contributed to the current findings of group 
differences in interpretation bias. The current study administered the standard BSIQ (Clark 
et al., 1997) but included two novel aspects: participants were asked questions intended to 
tap into their tendency to catastrophise about the future and to establish their ability to cope 
with negative outcomes. These two aspects will now be discussed in turn.  
 
4.2.2 Results in relation to catastrophising 
In the current study, participants were instructed to imagine that the negative interpretation 
of the ambiguous scenarios was true and asked what the future would be like. The results 
showed that veterans with PTSD held more catastrophic beliefs about the future, whereby 
they felt the repercussions of negative interpretations would be more severe and 
insurmountable, than veterans without PTSD. Somewhat surprisingly, veterans with PTSD 





The rationale for investigating catastrophising about the future in this study was that 
catastrophising is thought to both predict and exacerbate PTSD symptoms (Jenness et al., 
2016; Carty et al., 2011). Moreover, interpretation bias is one type of judgment bias (Constans 
et al., 2005) that emphasises people’s judgments about current, ambiguous information. A 
second type of judgment bias is subjective risk bias; this describes the tendency to 
overestimate the likelihood of negative events taking place in the future. This bias has also 
been linked to PTSD, with symptoms associated with a propensity to judge future negative 
events as both more probable and more costly (Thrasher & Dalgleish, 1999; Warda & Bryant, 
1998; Nortje et al., 2005). However, McManus and Ehlers (2008) found that in comparison 
with participants presenting with high levels of trait anxiety, those with PTSD tended to only 
demonstrate subjective risk bias in relation to scenarios that were similar to the type of 
traumatic event they had experienced. In the context of the current study, it was thus possible 
that participants with PTSD would not make more catastrophic judgements about the future 
relative to the control groups, since none of the scenarios related to combat. In fact, it was 
found that combat veterans with versus without PTSD were more likely to choose responses 
indicating that there would be negative consequences for the future and that these would be 
difficult to overcome. This finding provides some preliminary evidence for subjective risk 
bias in individuals with PTSD that generalises into multiple aspects of everyday life rather 
than remaining specific to situations related to traumatic events. However, further research 
exploring the influence of trauma-specific information on subjective risk bias (and other 
cognitive biases) is needed.  
 
Contrary to expectations, although combat veterans with PTSD tended to make more 
negative judgments about the future than civilian controls, this difference did not reach 
significance. This could indicate a greater degree of relative resilience in the veterans without 
PTSD, a factor that will be discussed in greater detail in relation to coping. 
 
4.2.3 Results in relation to coping  
Coping was thought to be an important factor in the current study since it was possible that 
even if the two combat veteran groups did not differ in interpretation bias, they might differ 
in coping ability. This was examined in two ways; firstly, participants were asked to imagine 
that the worst-case scenario was true and to judge their ability to cope and secondly, a 
questionnaire measure of coping strategies was administered. As expected, combat veterans 




scenarios. This group was also less likely to use self-sufficient coping strategies (such as 
problem-solving, personal growth, humour and acceptance) and more likely to use avoidant 
coping strategies (such as denial, ‘giving up’ and drinking alcohol).  Contrary to predictions, 
despite also having had combat exposure, veterans without PTSD generally viewed 
themselves as more able to cope with worst-case scenarios than civilian controls. This was 
the only difference between the two control groups, suggesting that although they made 
similar judgements about the likelihood and consequences of negative outcomes, combat 
veterans had increased resilience in the face of adversity. These findings will now be 
considered in relation to the literature on coping.  
 
The ability to cope with and recover from adversity is a factor that both protects against the 
development of PTSD and promotes recovery (Agaibi & Wilson, 2005). ‘Approach’ 
strategies that involve both practical and emotional problem-solving and eliciting support 
from others are generally thought to be the most adaptive. By contrast, ‘avoid strategies’ such 
as mental or behavioural disengagement, denial and substance misuse, are considered to be 
maladaptive and confer risk of PTSD and other psychopathology (Agaibi & Wilson, 2005; 
Litman, 2006). Research suggests that both cognitive appraisals and coping factors are 
associated with neurochemical responses to stress (Olff et al., 2005), and that cognitive bias 
directly influences PTSD symptoms but is also mediated by coping ability (Lambert et al., 
2013). Given the association between poor coping and PTSD, it was unsurprising that the 
veteran participants with PTSD in the current study rated themselves as less able to cope 
with the worst-case scenarios than both veteran and civilian control groups.  
 
Although differences between the two control groups were not initially predicted, it could 
be argued that greater self-reported coping ability in the veterans without PTSD as compared 
with civilians is consistent with the literature relating to military training and culture. For 
instance, military personnel are trained to cope with adverse situations in the context of war; 
enhanced general coping ability may be an enduring beneficial impact of this training. 
Another possible factor that may have contributed to different self-reported coping ability 
between the two control groups is the automaticity with which military personnel become 
accustomed to responding to hostile situations; a tendency to go into ‘auto pilot’ when faced 
with adversity may be protective in the long-term. Brim (2013) has also described ‘warrior 
ethos’ as an aspect of military culture; this endorses the suppression of emotions and the 
tolerance of pain. It might have been reasonable to expect that individuals who subscribe to 




or to appear weak. However, this seems unlikely, since veterans without PTSD did not report 
using more avoidant coping strategies than the other groups, and their self-reported use of 
emotion-regulation coping strategies and those involving seeking emotional support from 
others was comparable to controls. This suggests that veterans without PTSD may use 
similar strategies to civilians without PTSD when coping with adversity but have a higher 
threshold for what constitutes adversity. It is possible that the combat veterans without 
PTSD had extensive experience of tackling stressful situations whilst at war. They may thus 
have had a range of problem-solving strategies to draw upon, and greater confidence in their 
ability to overcome adversity. It is also possible that combat experiences involving life or 
death situations result in greater resilience to more commonplace negative events. This is 
consistent with the above finding that combat veterans with PTSD made significantly more 
catastrophic judgments about the future than those without PTSD, but did not differ 
significantly from civilian controls. This finding is also consistent with research suggesting 
that veterans may experience ‘post-traumatic growth’, or PTG, which has been described as 
positive, meaningful psychological changes arising from traumatic experiences, such as a 
sense of purpose or renewed appreciation for life (see Habib et al., 2018 for a review). 
 
What significance do the findings in relation to coping have for understanding combat-
related PTSD? It is important to note that in the current study, the direction of findings was 
unclear. It was not necessarily the case that combat experiences increased resilience, it is 
equally possible that people with greater coping ability or resilience choose to join the military 
in the first place. Regardless of the cause, a high level of psychological resilience is likely to 
be a feature of military culture and combat experiences that is undermined by PTSD. There 
may be a relationship between coping ability and reintegration into civilian life that can 
maintain or exacerbate symptoms. For instance, veterans without PTSD may feel more able 
to overcome the challenges associated with reintegration and may even experience relief and 
pleasure when faced with the prospect of resuming civilian roles and activities. Opportunities 
to re-engage in meaningful activity and social relationships may reinforce their perception 
that they are able to cope. By contrast, veterans with PTSD might struggle to seamlessly 
reprise all aspects of their civilian life; this in turn limits opportunities for social support that 
might otherwise help them to cope with symptoms. Persistent PTSD symptoms such as 
avoidance, vigilance and changes in mood may further alienate people’s loved ones, and also 
impact coping ability. The current findings may therefore reflect a complex interplay between 
PTSD symptoms and coping ability. Further exploration of coping strategies, both when 





The results discussed so far have highlighted interpretation bias, catastrophising and poor 
coping as factors that may maintain or exacerbate symptoms of combat-related PTSD. The 
cognitive model of PTSD is a theoretical framework that outlines the development and 
maintenance of PTSD, and the results will now be discussed in relation to this overarching 
model.  
 
4.2.4 Results in relation to cognitive model of PTSD 
How do cognitive models conceptualise the development and maintenance of PTSD in the 
general population? People are thought to have limited information processing capacity and 
thus to approach judgments and decisions on the basis of predisposition and subjective 
experience (Greifeneder et al., 2017). Subjective experience is key in the development of 
PTSD, since research suggests that factors such as perceived threat to life and ‘mental defeat’ 
(whereby people ‘give up’ during traumatic events and subsequently feel dehumanised and 
lacking in autonomy and self-esteem; Wilker et al., 2017) confer significant risk for people 
who have experienced a traumatic event (e.g. Alvarez-Conrad et al., 2001; Ehlers et al., 2000). 
Thus, for participants in the current study, it is possible that irrespective of the level of 
combat exposure, veterans with PTSD tended to appraise situations differently and judge 
the level of threat or long-term consequences to be more severe than those without PTSD. 
In line with cognitive models (e.g. Beck, 1963), these appraisals may have arisen from core 
beliefs. For instance, veteran participants with PTSD may have developed fundamental 
beliefs about the world being dangerous as a consequence of traumatic combat experiences 
that lead them to systematically overestimate threat. This overestimation of threat is 
consistent with research evidence suggesting that when faced with ambiguous information, 
people with PTSD may preferentially access negative or threat-related interpretations at the 
expense of more benign interpretations (Beck & Clark, 1997; Bomyea et al., 2017).  
 
An association between combat-related PTSD and cognitive biases arising from subjective 
experience may be further supported by the current findings relating to scenario type. It was 
found that group differences tended to be exacerbated for situations involving external 
threats (general events and interactions with people) versus internal threats (bodily symptoms 
of panic or other health conditions). It may be the case that combat veterans with PTSD 
were accustomed to ignoring pain or physical discomfort but continued to struggle with 
memories of the external threats faced in a warzone. It is arguable that if past experiences of 




two combat veteran groups should not have differed in their responses on the BSIQ. 
However, for those with PTSD, memories of past events tend to present a current sense of 
threat. The veterans with PTSD may therefore have had easier on-going access to threatening 
interpretations than those without PTSD. Moreover, the cognitive model indicates that 
triggers that produce a current sense of threat can become increasingly generalised (for 
example, a car backfiring initially produces the same emotional response as the sound of a 
gun being fired; eventually any loud noise produces this response; Ehlers & Clark, 2000). 
This could account for the fact that the combat veterans with PTSD endorsed more negative 
interpretations despite the scenarios being unrelated to combat. Taken together, the current 
findings, pertaining specifically to combat-related PTSD, are consistent with the cognitive 
model of PTSD in the general population, which particularly emphasises the role of cognitive 
appraisals in maintaining a continual sense of threat. However, it is important to consider 
the limitations of the cognitive model of PTSD. Whilst it offers a coherent account of the 
development and maintenance of symptoms of PTSD following singular traumatic events, it 
is less well-suited to conceptualising complex PTSD, following prolonged or repeated 
traumatic events (such as torture, slavery, or childhood sexual abuse; Cloitre, 2009). In 
contrast, theories underlying schema therapy, which considers developmental history and 
early maladaptive schemas, may help to conceptualise chronic or complex forms of PTSD, 
stemming from early traumatic experiences (Boterhoven de Haan et al., 2019). 
Neurocognitive theories underlying Narrative Exposure Therapy (NET) propose a network 
of interrelated sensory, cognitive emotional and physiological elements that represent 
multiple traumatic events. This network describes how an element from one event can trigger 
elements from others (Neuner et al., 2008). Although these alternative approaches offer 
some promise, the evidence base is currently weak in comparison with trauma-focused 
cognitive behavioural therapy (TF-CBT), which has been most thoroughly researched (e.g. 
Cusack et al., 2016; NICE, 2018). This may be because complex PTSD, which includes 
difficulties in emotional regulation and interpersonal relationships and strong negative beliefs 
about oneself over and above prerequisite diagnostic criteria for PTSD, has only recently 
been recognised as a formal diagnosis (ICD-11; World Health Organisation, 2018). Further 








It is important to consider the limitations of the current study. With respect to the study 
procedure, there was some risk of selection bias, since the recruitment methods varied 
between the three groups. However, this was to some extent unavoidable, since combat 
veterans are a specialist population and it is highly impractical to recruit them from the same 
source as civilians. A second procedural limitation was that telephone support was available 
to combat veterans. This was an ethical consideration, given the potential risks of describing 
negative events to individuals who were likely to have experienced high levels of stress over 
prolonged periods. For practical reasons, this was not offered to civilian participants. 
However, although a researcher was available by telephone to address any emotional 
difficulties or upsetting memories should they arise, participants did not in practice request 
assistance with the task, and did not report any practical or emotional difficulties completing 
the study. A small number of participants wished to discuss their past experiences very 
briefly, and this was facilitated, but these conversations took place at the end of the study. It 
was therefore unlikely that the availability of telephone support directly influenced task 
performance. Nonetheless, inconsistences in recruitment and task administration are 
potential confounding factors that could be amended in any future iterations of this study. 
 
There were also some limitations in terms of the sample of participants. For instance, combat 
exposure was not directly measured in the current study. Doing so may have strengthened 
the argument that the group differences were a consequence of PTSD rather than combat 
exposure. Nonetheless, only combat veterans were recruited and they were likely to have 
deployed to similar operations (specifically Iraq and Afghanistan). Another potential 
drawback was that the sample in the current study only involved male participants. This 
reflected the fact that the majority of combat personnel are male; recruiting an equal number 
of male and female participants would thus have been unrepresentative and including a small 
minority of female participants may have introduced a confound that would be difficult to 
control for. However, this neglects female experiences of PTSD in the military, which may 
have a distinct profile. For example, the literature has identified that female combat personnel 
who deploy are at increased risk of sexual harassment or assault (e.g. Leardmann et al., 2013), 
which in turn predicts PTSD (Kang et al., 2005). Future studies might therefore benefit from 
examining processes such as interpretation bias in female combat veterans.  
 
Finally, it is important to consider potential limitations in the study design. The BSIQ has 




PTSD (Lambert et al., 2013), and elicited group differences in the current study. However, 
there are some weaknesses in its design. Firstly, participants were asked to generate responses 
to and rank order explanations for all scenarios to start with, and then to re-read and provide 
ratings for scenario explanations. The rationale for asking ordering the questions in this way 
is to preclude interference between the ranking and rating questions but doing so introduces 
potential order effects. Secondly, it is unclear whether there is a meaningful distinction 
between the ranking and rating questions, since both elicit estimates of the likelihood of 
negative outcomes, and indeed the same pattern of results was found in relation to both 
questions in the current study. Future studies involving the BSIQ might therefore consider 
only asking a ranking or rating question, or using different sets of scenarios for these two 
scenario types. Lastly, the magnitude of potential negative consequences varies widely within 
and between scenario types in the BSIQ. For instance, in the example items described in 
Figure 2.1, a standoffish acquaintance or difficult work situation are unlikely to involve the 
same catastrophic consequences as a diagnosis of cancer or a heart defect. Future studies 
could refine the BSIQ to account for this inconsistency.  
 
Despite its limitations, the current study provides a novel contribution to the literature. In 
particular, although interpretation bias has clear relevance for PTSD, it has historically been 
underrepresented in the PTSD literature in comparison with attentional and memory biases 
(Bomyea et al., 2017). Moreover, the current study attempts to disentangle the relative 
contributions of combat exposure and PTSD symptoms by including both veteran and 
civilian control groups. The findings from the current study also have potential implications 
for further research and clinical practice; these will be outlined below.  
 
4.4 IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
A number of potential research directions have emerged from the current findings. These 
primarily fall into two categories: research relating to clinical populations and research 
relating to task design. With respect to populations, the literature suggests that people with 
PTSD stemming from different sources of trauma may present with different symptoms. 
The current study focused on combat veterans, partially because this population often has 
more severe and enduring symptoms and takes a long time to seek support from mental 
health services (Murphy & Busuttil, 2014). The current study compared combat veterans 
with PTSD against both non-PTSD veteran and civilian control groups in order to 
disentangle the relative contributions of PTSD symptoms and combat exposure. To elucidate 




could also investigate interpretation bias in other populations presenting with complex PTSD 
or who have experienced prolonged periods or multiple instances of exposure to trauma, 
such as refugees, victims of trafficking, or those working in the emergency services.  
 
One possible account of the current findings was that attenuated threat response when 
reintegrating into civilian life is associated with fewer adjustment difficulties, whereas the 
persistence of combat-level threat response is associated with greater PTSD 
symptomatology. However, this is a post-hoc explanation that not necessarily help predict 
PTSD; a longitudinal study may therefore be of value. Specifically, comparing different 
groups at multiple timepoints, (for instance, prior to deployment, immediately after discharge 
from service and after a period of reintegration into civilian life) might contribute to an 
understanding of the development of cognitive bias. Administering measures of cognitive 
bias alongside measures examining personality traits and early life history prior to deployment 
and might also illuminate the extent to which these factors confer vulnerability to PTSD.   
 
With respect to task design, the findings from the current study could be taken further by 
introducing various experimental manipulations. Firstly, a scenario-based task such as the 
BSIQ could be manipulated such that half the items pertain to everyday ambiguous situations 
in civilian life and the remaining half pertain to ambiguous situations in warzones. This might 
be particularly relevant given the findings from previous studies of cognitive bias indicating 
that results may vary depending on the match between task stimulus and the traumatic event 
experienced. In addition, this design might further help to unpick the influence of combat 
exposure versus PTSD. On the one hand, group differences might be less pronounced in 
combat-related scenarios, due to shared experiences and similar training. Alternatively, group 
differences might be preserved across scenario types, since veterans with PSTD may struggle 
with a persistent sense of current threat. In general, future studies may also benefit from the 
development and validation of a battery of military-specific scenario-based tasks.   
 
Secondly, future research could further explore factors such as beliefs about negative 
outcomes in the future or coping ability. This might involve inviting participants to generate 
more verbal explanations in addition to providing an explanation for ambiguous situations. 
For instance, they could describe what they expect will happen next, what the future will be 
like, and what they would do in order to cope. This might reveal a more nuanced 





Lastly, task scenarios could be systematically manipulated to include low threat versus high 
threat versions. They could also be manipulated to vary the degree of ambiguity in the 
situation. This might help to establish different thresholds at which situations are perceived 
to be threatening, which could have potential implications for symptom amelioration. This 
will be discussed alongside other potential clinical implications below.  
 
4.5 IMPLICATIONS FOR CLINICAL PRACTICE  
Before discussing potential clinical implications of the current study, it is worth briefly 
reviewing the challenges facing clinicians considering combat-related PTSD. At present, 
packages of support are available to aid reintegration into civilian life and prevent 
psychological ill health amongst combat personnel (e.g. Greenberg et al., 2008; Frappell-
Cooke et al., 2010; Fertout et al., 2011). These programmes are thought to boost resilience, 
help to reduce alcohol misuse and general mental distress, but few interventions exist to 
prevent the development of PTSD (Fertout et al., 2011; Mulligan et al., 2013). Moreover, the 
evidence suggests that combat personnel with PTSD are reluctant to seek support for mental 
health difficulties (Hoge et al., 2004), view these difficulties as less legitimate than physical 
ailments (Forbes et al., 2012; Murphy & Busuttil, 2014) and are distrusting of those providing 
mental health support (French et al., 2004). 
 
The research presented in the current study is primarily mechanistic but may shed some light 
on factors to consider when refining treatment of combat-related PTSD. Firstly, as described 
above, the current approach to investigating interpretation bias may help to establish 
different thresholds at which ambiguous information is perceived as threatening for different 
participant groups. This may in turn have potential implications for the development of skills 
training programmes to reduce interpretation bias. These could involve supporting 
individuals to generate a broader range of interpretations. Treatment analogues exist in the 
attentional bias literature; for instance, studies have shown that measures of attentional bias 
can be used as part of a skills training programme both to reduce bias and to ameliorate 
PTSD symptoms (Wald et al., 2016). However, these are dot-probe type tasks that have 
limited real-world applicability. Alternatively, the current study highlights the strengths of 
scenario-based, more ecologically valid tasks in identifying cognitive bias and these methods 
could feasibly be adapted as a treatment programme. Secondly, training programmes that 
specifically target combat-related experiences could be developed. For example, scenarios 
that would enable clients to practise identifying the similarities and differences between their 





Another potential clinical implication of the current findings relates to the role of coping, 
since participants with PTSD reported lower ability to cope and a more avoidant coping style 
relative to controls. Future clinical interventions for combat-related PTSD could therefore 
focus on assessing coping style and developing alternative, more adaptive coping strategies. 
This approach is consistent with evidence suggesting that coping strategies are malleable 
(Nielson & Knardahl, 2014). Finally, veterans currently report a significant number of 
barriers to them accessing support. These include a perceived lack of understanding from 
general mental health services, a lack of knowledge regarding the support that is available 
and in particular internalised stigma (whereby people judge themselves negatively as a result 
of their mental health difficulties; Murphy & Busuttil, 2015). A recent review found that 
supporting individuals to reduce internalised stigma is a vital step in enabling military 
personnel to engage in help-seeking behaviour (Murphy & Busuttil, 2015). It is theoretically 
possible that a systematic tendency to interpret ambiguous behaviour in others (e.g. general 
mental health services) as negatively-intentioned or judgmental, a tendency for general 
mental health services to lack specialised knowledge about military culture, and a tendency 
for military personnel to favour peer support are all factors that perpetuate barriers to help-
seeking. Therefore, in the long-term, treatment of combat-related PTSD may be optimised 
by the armed forces and general mental health services working more collaboratively to 
develop a shared understanding of combat-related mental health difficulties and to facilitate 
improved trust in services. 
 
4.6 CONCLUDING COMMENTS  
The present study was designed to investigate interpretation bias in combat veterans with 
and without PTSD. A civilian control group was also included, in order to elucidate the 
contributions of combat exposure versus PTSD symptomatology. The findings revealed that 
veterans with PTSD tended to interpret ambiguous scenarios more negatively and judged 
negative interpretations to be more likely than did the veteran and civilian control groups. 
This suggests that interpretation bias may be a feature of combat-related PTSD. Moreover, 
the two control groups did not differ, indicating that interpretation bias is associated with 
PTSD rather than combat exposure. The current study also found that veterans with versus 
without PTSD judged the future to be more catastrophic, which has preliminary implications 
for the role of subjective risk bias. Lastly, veterans with PTSD judged themselves to be less 
able to cope with adversity and used more avoidant coping strategies in comparison with 




events and made similar judgments about the likelihood and consequences of negative 
interpretations. They also did not differ in their self-reported coping strategies. However, 
veterans without PTSD rated themselves as more able to cope with adversity than did civilian 
controls. This suggests that veterans without PTSD may have been particularly resilient. 
Taken together, the current study offers a novel contribution to the literature, since it was 
focused on interpretation bias (which has been comparatively understudied), used a relatively 
ecologically valid task, and expanded understanding of combat-related PTSD. The findings 
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APPENDIX 2: COMBAT STRESS COVER LETTER   




Dear XXX  
My name is Kari and I am a trainee clinical psychologist based at Kings College 
London. I am writing to you to tell you about a study I am running. I am interested 
in learning about how combat veterans make sense of ambiguous everyday 
situations. My study will involve reading short descriptions of everyday situations 
and answering questions about what you think is going on. This is an online study, 
although I will also phone you to answer any questions that may come up while 
you are taking part. It should last no more than an hour, and you will be paid £15 
as a thank you for your time.  
Combat Stress have very kindly agreed to send this letter on my behalf, but have 
not passed your details to me directly. If you think you might be interested in 
taking part, you can read a more detailed information sheet attached to this letter. 
If you decide to take part, or if you have any questions you would like to ask me, 
you an email me on: VASS@kcl.ac.uk. Alternatively, you can send the attached 
opt-in form to the address below.  
Please remember that whatever you decide, this will have no impact on your 






Dr Kari Vas 
ASB, 4 Windsor Walk 
Denmark Hill 











APPENDIX 3: COMBAT STRESS ONLINE ADVERT 
 
 
***Paid Combat Veteran Study*** 
  
Many veterans suffer with PTSD following their experiences in combat. Learning 
more about how these experiences shape the way they see the world might be 
an important step in improving psychological support available to veterans. I am 
therefore running a study looking at how combat veterans with PTSD make 
sense of ambiguous everyday situations. My study involves reading short 
descriptions of everyday situations and answering questions about what you think 
is going on. 
  
This is an online study, although I will also phone you to answer any questions 
that may come up while you are taking part. It should last no more than an hour, 
and you will be paid £15 as a thank you for your time. 
  
You can take part in this study if you are: 
• Male 
• A combat veteran 
• Living with a diagnosis of PTSD  
 
If you are interested in taking part or if you have more questions you would like 
to ask before deciding, please email me on: vass@kcl.ac.uk  
  










Dear XXX  
My name is Kari and I am a trainee clinical psychologist based at Kings College 
London. I am writing to you to tell you about a study I am running. I am interested 
in learning about how combat veterans make sense of ambiguous everyday 
situations. My study will involve reading short descriptions of everyday situations 
and answering questions about what you think is going on. This is an online study, 
although I will also phone you to answer any questions that may come up while 
you are taking part. It should last no more than an hour, and you will be paid £15 
as a thank you for your time.  
If you think you might be interested in taking part, you can read a more detailed 
information sheet attached to this email. If you decide to take part, or if you have 
any questions you would like to ask me, you an email me on: VASS@kcl.ac.uk.  
 
Alternatively, you can simply email the attached opt-in form, or send it to the 
address below.  
 






Dr Kari Vyas 
The King’s Centre for Military Health Research (KCMHR) 
King’s College London 










APPENDIX 5: CIVILAN CONTROLS ONLINE ADVERT 
 
 
 ***PAID STUDY: How do you interpret everyday, ambiguous situations?***  
 
My name is Kari and I am a trainee clinical psychologist based at Kings College 
London. I am interested in learning about how combat veterans make sense of 
ambiguous everyday situations. In order to explore this question, I would also like 
to see how people without any military experience respond.   
My study will involve reading short online descriptions of everyday situations and 
answering questions about what you think is going on. It should last no more than 
an hour, and you will be paid £15 as a thank you for your time.  
You can take part if: 
• You are male 
• You are over the age of 18 
• You have no military experience 
• You have never been given a diagnosis of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder  
 





If you have any questions you would like to ask me, you an email me on: 
VASS@kcl.ac.uk.  
 








APPENDIX 6: STUDY INFORMATION SHEET 
 
INFORMATION SHEET FOR PARTICIPANTS 
REMAS Reference Number: HR-17/18-5398 
Invitation to take part in research study: Everyday Interpretations in Combat 
Veterans with and without PTSD 
Dear Participant,  
We would like to invite you to take part in a research study being undertaken by Dr Kari 
Vyas of the Kings Centre of Military Health Research, Professor Neil Greenberg of the 
Academic Department of Military Mental Health, King’s College London and Dr Dominic 
Murphy, clinical psychologist with Combat Stress. You should only participate if you want 
to; choosing not to take part will not disadvantage you in any way. Before you decide 
whether you want to take part, it is important for you to understand why the research is 
being done and what your participation will involve. Please take time to read the following 
information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. Ask us if there is anything that 
is not clear or if you would like more information.  
Why are we carrying out this study? 
The purpose of this study is to explore the relationship between post-traumatic stress in 
combat veterans and interpretations of everyday situations.  
 
This information will contribute to greater understanding of the profile of strengths and 
difficulties of combat veterans who have experienced extremely stressful circumstances 
whilst deployed. In the long-term, this will hopefully promote more specialised packages 
of support for veterans experiencing difficulties after returning home. This study shall 
also contribute towards a Doctorate in Clinical Psychology qualification for Kari Vyas.  
 
Confidentiality 
All of the information that you provide will be anonymised and stored securely in one of 
two ways. Any paper documentation will be stored in a locked filing cabinet. Electronic 
files will be password-protected. None of the data we collect will have any directly 
identifiable information about you stored with it. We can assure you that none of the 
information you provide will be communicated back to the military in any way that you 
will be identified. You have our full assurance that we take confidentiality very seriously 
indeed. 
 
What will happen if I agree to take part? 
If you are interested in taking part, we will arrange a date and time at your convenience. 
The study involves completing an online survey. You will read about a variety of everyday 
situations, and you will be asked to answer questions about what you think is happening. 
The online survey also includes two other brief questionnaires – one about challenging 
circumstances you may have experienced or difficult memories of these circumstances, 
and one about your coping strategies. We will send you the website address for this 
survey via email. Kari Vyas, the trainee clinical psychologist running this study, will also 




to clarify any questions you may have. The duration of the study will be at most 1hour, 
and you will be paid £15 for your participation.  
Are there any risks? 
If you agree to take part in this study, you will read about various situations and make 
judgments about what is happening. Some of these situations could be interpreted as 
uncomfortable. For example, they may describe a person looking unhappy or 
experiencing some physical discomfort. The risks in this study are therefore minimal. 
However, some people may find the descriptions of everyday situations somewhat 
distressing. Please note that if you were to feel very distressed, you can stop the study 
at any time or request a break without giving a reason. You may also express any 
concerns about the study or discuss any feelings of distress with the trainee clinical 
psychologist on the phone. If you change your mind about participation, you may also 
choose to withdraw your data from the study for up to 28 days after you take part, without 
giving a reason.  
 
What will happen after the study? 
After you complete the online survey, you will have the opportunity to discuss any 
thoughts you had during the study. If you would like to receive a copy of the overall study 
results, this can be arranged. Upon completion of the project, the findings will be written 
up in a doctoral thesis and will eventually be submitted for publication in a peer-reviewed 
journal. The write-up will be a summary of all data and will not contain personal 
information about any research participants.  
 
How do I take part?  
If you are interested in taking part in the study and are willing to be contacted via the 
telephone to discuss participation further, please fill in your telephone details in the 
attached consent form and return it to me via the email address below. You can also use 





Dr Kari Vyas 
The King’s Centre for Military Health Research (KCMHR) 
King’s College London 







If this study has harmed you in any way, you can contact King’s College London using the 
details below for further advice and information: 
Professor Neil Greenberg, Academic Department of Military Mental Health,  
King’s College London, Weston Education Centre, 10 Cutcombe Road, London SE5 9RJ 






APPENDIX 7: STUDY CONSENT FORM 
 
CONSENT FORM FOR PARTICIPANTS IN RESEARCH 
STUDIES 
 
Thank you for considering taking part in this research. Please complete this 
form after you have read the Information Sheet on the previous page. 
 
Title of Study: Everyday Interpretations in Combat Veterans 
REMAS Reference Number: HR-17/18-5398 
 
Please tick or initial the boxes below: 
 
1. I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet dated 
[INSERT DATE AND VERSION NUMBER] for the above study. I have had 
the opportunity to consider the information and asked questions which 
have been answered satisfactorily. 
 
2. I understand that I will be able to stop participating in this study at any 
time and to withdraw my data up to 28 days after participating without 
giving a reason 
 
3. I consent to the processing of my personal information for the purposes 
explained to me.  I understand that such information will be handled in 
accordance with the terms of the UK Data Protection Act 1998. 
 
4. I understand that my information may be subject to review by responsible 
individuals from the College for monitoring and audit purposes. 
 
5. I understand that confidentiality and anonymity will be maintained and it 
will not be possible to identify me in any publications   
 
6. I agree to be contacted in the future by King’s College London 
researchers who would like to invite me to participate in follow up studies 
to this project, or in future studies of a similar nature. 
 
 
Name: ___________________________________________________ 
 
 
Date: _______________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
